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What factors ensure the success of an international mediation effort in an intractable conflict? 
Academics and practitioners remain divided on the issue, with previous research offering 
many and varied explanations. Existing studies have focused on the conflict’s intensity, the 
nature of the issues, the parties’ motivation to mediate, and the international context in order 
to understand the causes of a successful mediation. This research employs a framework 
incorporating contextual, behavioural, and procedural factors in order to determine the 
explanatory value of (a) the timing of a third-party’s entry into the conflict, (b) mediator 
impartiality and (c) legitimacy, and (d) the mediator’s strategy in two cases of international 
mediation in intractable conflicts. Through an in-depth analysis of Northern Ireland and 
Kosovo, this thesis argues that Northern Ireland’s successful mediation experience may be 
attributed to propitious timing and the presence of an impartial and legitimate mediator. 
Similarly, the failure of the mediation effort in Kosovo may have resulted from a 
combination of inauspicious timing and the presence of a mediator who was perceived by one 
of the negotiating parties as biased and illegitimate. While mediation is not necessarily a 
panacea for all conflicts, an understanding of which conditions lead to mediation success will 
aid practitioners in future mediation efforts. 
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Since the early 1990s, the nature of warfare has changed dramatically. The proxy wars which 
characterised the Cold War have made way for devastating civil and inter-communal 
conflicts in places as diverse as Sudan, Rwanda, Central Asia and Bosnia. At the same time 
as these conflicts have increased in both number and severity, there has been a corresponding 
proliferation in the appetite for negotiated settlements, as witnessed in Northern Ireland, 
Guatemala, and Mozambique (Crocker et al. 1999, 3). The vicious nature of these 
contemporary conflicts, and the high costs for the international community of failing to 
prevent or end these wars have together inspired a third development: namely, an increased 
role for the international community in peacemaking and peacekeeping. The heightened 
interest of international actors in attempting to manage these pernicious conflicts is 
manifested in their increasing involvement in efforts – both formal and informal – to mediate 
political agreements. Nevertheless, despite the involvement of third-party intermediaries, 
many of these conflicts have continued to stubbornly resist attempts at conflict management 
or resolution.  
In most disputes – be they interstate or intrastate – the parties involved have a variety of 
means at their disposal to respond to or resolve their conflict. The most destructive option 
entails the resort to violence and coercion. A more constructive approach involves various 
forms of negotiation between the parties. However, in those instances where violence is an 
unfeasible option, and negotiations between conflicting parties are either difficult to initiate 
or have reached an impasse, the parties may require assistance from a party – or parties – 
external to the dispute. In these circumstances, mediation – most succinctly defined as third-
party assistance to two or more interacting parties (Kressel and Pruitt 1989) – offers an 
appropriate method of conflict management.  
Why have some international conflict management endeavours succeeded while others have 
not? The intention of this thesis is to explore the reasons behind the success and failure of 
two recent cases of third-party mediation efforts in Northern Ireland and Kosovo. This 
research aims to contribute to the wider academic debate concerning which factors lead to 
successful outcomes in mediation processes. It seeks to answer: “why were the mediation 
efforts of external actors in Northern Ireland successful, whilst the attempts by the 
international community to mediate the crisis in Kosovo failed?” 
In an effort to resolve this puzzle, a qualitative approach is adopted. Four hypotheses are 
tested against the aforementioned cases. Process-tracing is used to exhaustively analyse the 
sequential processes within the two cases. The cases are then compared, and John Stuart 
Mill’s ‘method of difference’ – which relies on the logic of elimination – is employed in 
order to identify the variables which may be causally associated with the outcome of a 
successful mediation process. This thesis will argue that the timing of the third-party 
intervention, in addition to the mediator’s leverage and impartiality help to explain the 
ultimate success of Northern Ireland’s mediation process and the failure of Kosovo’s.  
This thesis is structured as follows: in the first chapter the theoretical background of third-
party mediation is established. The intellectual foundations of this thesis are found in the 
work of I.W. Zartman, whose concept of a ‘Mutually Hurting Stalemate’ (MHS) highlights 
the importance of timing to successful mediation. However, as demonstrated by an overview 
of the mediation literature, factors other than propitious timing may also contribute to a 
successful outcome. The second chapter develops the hypotheses to be tested in the two case 
studies, and reviews the chosen methodology (the case study approach, process-tracing, and 
Mill’s ‘method of difference’). The third chapter considers the third-party mediation efforts 
in Northern Ireland. It highlights the sources of the conflict’s intractability and analyses 
previous notable attempts to manage the conflict. This within-case analysis demonstrates the 
importance of propitious timing and argues that these efforts failed because the conflict was 
not yet ripe for resolution. The chapter continues by considering the impact of the external 
environment on the conflict, before studying the process which ultimately led to the 
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement of April 1998. Chapter four follows a similar structure, but 
instead considers the failure of the 2005-2007 Ahtisaari-led mediation process to determine 
Kosovo’s final status. In the final chapter, the two cases are compared and the logic of 
elimination employed in order to identify those variables which could be causally associated 
with mediation success in Northern Ireland. This thesis concludes with an examination of 
possible avenues for future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION: MANAGING CONFLICTS 
Conflict is the most insidious and costly of all social processes. Intractable conflicts – also 
referred to as ‘protracted conflicts’ (Azar 1990) and ‘enduring rivalries’ (Goertz and Diehl 
1993) – are a particularly vicious sub-category of conflict which continue over an extended 
period of time, are characterised by ever-present tension and violence, and are arenas for 
many futile attempts at management or resolution (Bercovitch 2007, 101). Such conflicts are 
characterised by negative-sum outcomes in which there are no winners, as all the parties are 
victimised by the process (Azar 1990, 15).  
The question of how to manage intractable conflicts is complex, as they most often herald the 
breakdown of communication within a society and produce high levels of animosity and 
distrust. Disputing parties may therefore find it preferable to delegate the management of 
their conflict to a third-party mediator. The main focus of this research is therefore mediation, 
the most extensively employed method of conflict management. Almost half of all crises in 
the post-Cold War era have been mediated by third parties (Beardsley et al. 2006, 59). The 
method’s popularity is often attributed to the voluntary and non-binding nature of mediation, 
which makes it ideally suited to managing conflicts where the relationship between the 
parties has deteriorated to such an extent that direct negotiations are deemed impossible.  
 
1.1.1 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT VS CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Protracted conflicts are often fought over important issues such as identity or struggles for 
power and self-determination (Deutsch 2006; Coleman 2006). Compounding the difficulty of 
managing these conflicts is the inter-generational perpetuation of the conflict, which is 
facilitated by the fact that relations between the parties develop in settings where exclusive 
social structures limit intergroup contact. This lack of interaction enables the unhindered 
development of stereotypical images of the other and generates mutual suspicions and 
animosity. The nature of intractable conflicts is such that the parties often feel that “at best 
they may reach a temporary cessation of violence [but that] they cannot reach a fundamental 
and genuine resolution of their issues” (Bercovitch 2007, 100). In these circumstances, 
conflict management – the settlement and containment of violent conflict (Ramsbotham et al. 
2011, 31) – is more feasible than conflict resolution, which implies that the deep-rooted 
sources of the conflict are addressed and transformed, and that the behaviour and attitudes of 
the disputants are no longer violent or hostile.  
 
1.1.2 ‘SUCCESSFUL’ MEDIATION 
This research understands mediation to be a tool of conflict management. It therefore 
considers ceasefires, peace treaties or political settlements agreed to by all the disputants as 
indicators of a successful mediation effort (Siniver 2006). If a settlement is negotiated but not 
agreed to by both sides, the process is considered a failure. In reality ‘success’ is not such a 
binary concept: the signing of a peace agreement does not necessarily guarantee a 
fundamental change in the underlying societal structures which initially gave rise to the 
conflict. The Oslo Accords, for example, are perhaps the most pertinent example of an 
objective mediation success (a binding political agreement was reached), yet they failed to 
bring about an end to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, which continues to this day. 
Furthermore, the failure of the parties to reach an agreement does not necessarily mean that a 
significant improvement in the relationship between the two parties was not achieved. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis, success is treated as a mutually exclusive 
concept.   
 
1.2 MEDIATION AS A TOOL OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
 
 1.2.1 DEFINITION 
Given its nature, mediation is widely considered to be the most effective form of conflict 
management, particularly in an international system in which the principle of sovereignty 
remains preeminent. Over time, several definitions of mediation have been proposed. 
Different definitions purport to (a) capture the gist of what mediators do or hope to achieve; 
(b) distinguish between mediation and related processes of third-party intervention, such as 
arbitration; and (c) describe mediators’ attributes (Bercovitch 2009, 341).  
Mitchell (1981, 287) defines mediation as an intermediary activity which seeks to “achieve 
some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least end 
disruptive conflict behaviour”. Moore (1996, 6), on the other hand, views mediation as “an 
extension and elaboration of the negotiation process”, which involves the intervention of “an 
acceptable, impartial, and neutral third-party” – who has no authoritative decision-making 
power – to assist parties in reaching a mutually acceptable settlement. Other definitions 
(Folberg and Taylor 1984; Bingham 1985) consider neutrality and impartiality to be the 
distinguishing features of mediation.  
Mediation is here defined as “a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from 
the parties’ own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer 
of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organisation, a group, or a state) to 
change their perceptions or behaviour, and to do so without resorting to physical force or 
invoking the authority of law” (Bercovitch 1992, 8). This definition highlights mediation’s 
most important characteristics: it is a tool of conflict management which involves the 
intervention of an outside party seeking to affect the conflict in some way; it is non-binding 
and, most importantly, voluntary. These features make mediation ideally suited to managing 
intractable conflicts, for while the mediator may retain some control over various aspects of 
the process, ultimate control over the final settlement remains with the parties who must live 
with and abide by any agreement.  
 
1.3 MULTIPARTY MEDIATION 
In intractable conflicts, successful mediation is likely to be the result of sustained 
involvement by third parties. Nevertheless, it is not always possible for one party alone to 
successfully manage a conflict, and thus international actors turn to multiparty mediation. 
What is multiparty mediation, and what are the advantages or disadvantages of such an 
approach for dealing with protracted conflicts?  
 
1.3.1 DEFINITION 
Multiparty mediations may be ‘simultaneous’, ‘sequential’, or ‘composite’. Simultaneous 
efforts involve the intervention of multiple mediators, representing international or regional 
organisations, national governments, and NGOs, that do not necessarily coordinate their 
efforts (Berridge 2002, 195; Böhmelt 2012, 702). In sequential mediated interventions, single 
mediators may execute deliberate ‘hand-offs’ at various watersheds in the life cycle of the 
conflict when different kinds of mediator appear more suitable (Berridge 2002, 196). 
Composite mediations are those in which the mediation initiative is undertaken by a 
collective body such as a coalition of states representing more than one set of national 
interests. Multiparty mediation is defined here as: “simultaneous interventions by more than 
one mediator in a conflict, interventions by composite actors such as regional organisations or 
contact groups, as well as sequential mediated interventions that again involve more than one 
party” (Crocker et al. 1999, 10).  
 
1.3.2 BENEFITS AND LIABILITIES OF MULTIPARTY MEDIATION 
According to the practitioner literature (Crocker et al. 1999), a multiparty mediation process 
faces several unique challenges. To be successful, members of a mediating coalition must 
share largely similar goals, be willing to work together, be able to maintain a coherent 
strategy in order to coordinate their initiatives, and be willing to oversee the process from 
beginning to end (Crocker et al. 1999, 22). These criteria may be difficult to meet, thereby 
jeopardising the success of the process.  
A lack of shared ideas about the objectives of the process creates confusion and produces 
mixed messages which consequently destabilise the mediation endeavour. The presence of 
multiple mediators enables the disputants to ‘shop around’ and play the intermediaries off 
against each other. This strategy fundamentally undermines the process by creating a 
fragmented international response which serves only to “reinforce fragmentation in the 
conflict and complicate resolution” (Ki-Moon 2009, 6), and by enabling parties that are not 
truly committed to achieving a peaceful settlement to procrastinate and delay conflict 
resolution. This can lead to a serious deterioration of the overall conflict situation and 
endanger the mediation effort.  
While multiparty mediation adds an additional layer of complexity for all parties involved, it 
also often provides an opportunity for parties to move a peace process towards settlement. 
More mediating parties tend to equate to more leverage and credibility, raising the prospects 
of a stable peace agreement by isolating spoilers and limiting their ability to derail the 
process. If a coalition of mediators is able to work in unison, they should in principle be more 
likely than a single mediator to establish leverage over the antagonists (Crocker et al. 1999; 
Böhmelt 2012). This leverage can then create obligations and expectations that help ensure 
parties’ compliance with the agreement, by definition increasing the chances of successful 
mediation. The ability of mediators to ‘borrow leverage’ through cooperation and 
coordination with other external parties is unique to multiparty mediation and demonstrates 
the potential for a greater number of parties to successfully mediate protracted disputes.  
 
1.3.3 THE CONFLICT CYCLE AND MULTIPARTY MEDIATION 
Given the cyclical nature of violence in intractable conflicts, multiparty efforts enable 
different mediators to enter the conflict at various points, bringing with them different skills, 
resources and relationships to move the parties towards agreement. At the low-end of the 
conflict curve, before the outbreak of large-scale violence, mediated interventions by non-
state actors may help to defuse tensions by enabling the parties to talk in an informal setting. 
In the ‘middle range’, where the violent conflict moves towards its peak, stereotypes and 
perceptions of the other side have solidified, and parties are reluctant to accept outside 
intervention. In this context, the conflict is still not ripe for high-level intervention, but low-
key mediators, such as NGOs may help parties establish a dialogue without losing face 
publicly (Vuković 2013, 43). Once communication has been established mediators that 
possess coercive or reward power can be introduced in order to persuade conflicting parties to 
change their positions and move towards a mutually acceptable solution. The ‘high end’ of 
the conflict curve requires mediators with muscle in order to induce the parties to participate 
in talks and to move them away from conflicting deadlock (Vuković 2013, 43). The 
flexibility that a multiparty approach offers for dealing with the nature of violence in a 
protracted conflict significantly heightens the chance of successful mediation. 
 
1.4 EXISTING EXPLANATIONS OF MEDIATION SUCCESS 
The academic and practitioner literatures on mediation have proffered a number of 
explanations for mediation success. These explanations include the characteristics of the 
dispute, the internal characteristics of the parties, and the international context. 
 
1.4.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISPUTE 
Existing research highlights three characteristics of the dispute held to affect mediation 
outcomes: conflict ripeness; the conflict’s intensity; and the nature of the issue(s) in dispute.  
 
1.4.1.1 CONFLICT RIPENESS 
Willingness to address the conflict and accept the assistance of a mediator is often considered 
a necessary condition for mediation success (Rubin 1981, 5). Analysts have frequently 
highlighted the importance of proper timing of mediation initiatives for achieving successful 
outcomes. The concept of a ripe moment centres on the parties’ perception of a ‘mutually 
hurting stalemate’ (MHS), a situation where “the parties find themselves locked in a conflict 
from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them 
(although not necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons” (Zartman 2000, 228). The 
second element necessary for a ripe moment is the perception of a ‘way out’. The disputants 
themselves do not have to be able to identify a specific solution, but only believe that a 
negotiated solution is possible and that the other party is similarly willing to search for a 
resolution to the conflict. Ripeness theory offers an important explanation for the overall 
success of a mediation effort, as will be demonstrated in the second chapter.  
 
1.4.1.2 CONFLICT INTENSITY 
Although the concept is somewhat ambiguous, the level of intensity is a second characteristic 
of the dispute commonly presumed to affect mediation outcomes, although analysts disagree 
strongly about its impact (Kleiboer 1996, 363). Some (Jackson 1952; Young 1967) suggest 
that the greater the conflict’s intensity, the greater the likelihood that mediation will be 
accepted and be successful, as a way of minimising losses if nothing else. An opposite view 
contends that the greater the intensity and the higher the losses, the more polarised the 
parties’ positions will become and the more determined each will be to ‘win’ at all costs, 
leading them to reject external attempts at mediation (Burton 1969; Brockner 1982).  
 
1.4.1.3 THE NATURE OF THE ISSUE(S) 
The mediation literature also abounds with notions linking mediation success to the nature of 
the issues in dispute. Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991, 14) distinguish between 
different types of issues: (1) incompatible claims to a specific peace of territory; (2) ideology; 
(3) security; and (4) self-determination and independence. They conclude that disputes 
involving claims to independence or conflicts over ideology are far less amenable to 
mediation than disputes concerning territorial or security issues. Similarly, Lall (1966), Frei 
(1976) and Ott (1972) argue that if a dispute affects the parties’ vital security interests, no 
amount of mediation by a third party is likely to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. In 
contrast, some (Fisher 1972, Rubin 1981) argue that even if an issue appears to be zero-sum, 
it may be possible to separate it into negotiable sub-units and attempt to trade these off 
against one another.   
 
1.4.2 INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTIES 
Existing research concerning the parties engaged in mediation primarily focuses on their 
motivation to mediate.  
 
 
 
 
1.4.2.1 MOTIVATION TO MEDIATE 
Willingness to address the conflict and accept the assistance of a mediator is often considered 
a necessary condition for mediation success (Rubin 1981, 5). The benefits parties expect to 
receive from participating in a mediation process influence their decision to accept an 
intermediary’s offer of help to resolve their conflict. Disputants could benefit from a 
mediator’s expertise, or they may decide that they will gain more from mediation than from 
maintaining the status quo. In Rwanda, after the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) invasion in 
October 1990, the government accepted mediation in 1992 because of the conflict’s impact 
on its economic and political fortunes (Maundi et al. 2006, 52). Similarly, the RPF accepted 
mediation because it sought international recognition, sympathy, and support, and it wanted a 
quick political solution because “its supporters could not afford to sustain the armed 
insurgency for a long time” (Maundi et al. 2006, 53). In this case, both parties expected to 
benefit more from accepting mediation than from continued fighting.  
Domestic political cover is another expected benefit of mediation. Beardsley (2010, 395-96) 
suggests that combatants may seek mediation when they face high domestic audience costs 
for unpopular, though potentially prudent, concessions. In this instance, intermediaries can 
fulfil two roles: first, they can share the burden of responsibility for the concessions, and 
second, they can inform the domestic audiences about the merits of the concessions. These 
mechanisms were at work in the Iran hostage crisis of 1979-81. Christopher (1985) argues 
that Algeria played a face-saving role, as domestic audiences in both the US and Iran had 
made it prohibitively costly for the two sides to conduct direct negotiations. By relaying each 
side’s messages, Algeria enabled negotiations to occur which, in turn, led to a mutually 
acceptable agreement. That the negotiations took place in relative secrecy obscured which 
parties were most responsible for the concessions made by both sides (Beardsley, 2010: 397). 
If parties expect to gain more from participating in a mediation process than they lose, they 
will be more committed and far more motivated to find a mutually acceptable agreement, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of a successful mediation outcome. 
 
1.4.3 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
The international context in which any conflict occurs also affects the outcomes of mediation 
efforts (Kleiboer 1996, 374). The impact of other events or conflicts taking place 
simultaneously is particularly relevant. Kriesberg (1987, 380) argues that de-escalation and 
successful mediation are more likely to occur when a particular conflict’s salience declines as 
other fights become of greater importance to one or more of the adversaries. The 1979 
Algerian mediation process between the US and Iran illustrates this point. As Algeria began 
its initial mediation efforts, Iran became heavily involved in a war with Iraq. This acted as an 
obstacle to settlement in the first two months of the mediation endeavour, but as the costs of 
the Iran-Iraq war began to mount, it increased pressure on the Iranian clerics to find a suitable 
settlement, or ‘way out’, in order to focus on its more pressing conflict with Iraq (Sick 1985; 
Kleiboer 1996). 
 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
As this chapter has demonstrated, mediation is an important tool of conflict management 
undertaken by a wide range of actors. This chapter also studied existing explanations in the 
literature of the factors affecting the mediation process. It considered a conflict’s ripeness, the 
dispute’s intensity, the nature of the issues, the parties’ motives to mediate, and the 
international context. The following chapter develops four hypotheses which, as this research 
will argue, influenced the outcome of the mediation efforts in Northern Ireland and Kosovo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
To reiterate, for the purposes of this research, a successful mediation endeavour is one in 
which a ceasefire, peace treaty or political settlement is agreed to by all parties. The first 
chapter considered various factors that academics have previously argued help explain a 
mediation outcome. This chapter argues that in order to better explain mediation outcome, 
any analysis should take into consideration three distinct types of factors: contextual, 
behavioural and procedural. This chapter builds on these three categories to develop four 
hypotheses which may plausibly explain the success of the mediation process in Northern 
Ireland and the failure of third-party efforts in Kosovo. 
 
2.2 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
Contextual factors refer to systemic variables which establish the mediator’s degree of 
manoeuvrability before the process has begun. As discussed previously, in the context of an 
enduring conflict, the nature of the dispute and the issues to be resolved play important roles 
in determining the ultimate success of mediation. This thesis contends that an even more 
important contextual variable is the timing of a mediator’s entry into a dispute. 
Conflicts are dynamic and can develop and change at remarkable speed. Most often, conflicts 
pass through a life-cycle that encompasses a number of distinguishable phases. Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse and Miall (2011, 13) develop a conflict escalation and de-escalation model in 
which escalation phases move along a normal distribution curve from the initial differences 
that are part of all social developments, through the emergence of an original contradiction 
that may or may not remain latent, on up through the process of polarisation in which the 
conflict becomes manifest, and culminating in the outbreak of direct violence and war 
(emphasis in original). It is assumed that certain stages are more amenable to outside 
intervention than others (Young 1967). The underlying hypothesis is that to be successful, 
mediation needs to be initiated at such ‘ripe moments’.  
What constitutes a ripe moment remains in dispute. Some commentators believe that conflicts 
“follow the logic of ‘clock time’, [meaning that] the duration of the conflict in terms of days, 
months, or years is linked to the persistence or change of attitudes of the adversaries toward 
the conflict” (Kleiboer 1996, 362). The ‘classical’ position (Northedge and Donelan 1971; 
Zartman 2000) advocates late entry, and is based on the idea that mediation will be most 
fruitful once each side to the dispute has demonstrated their willingness to moderate its 
intransigence and revise its expectations. This, they contend, is far more likely to occur later 
in the conflict, as the objective evidence concerning the futility of violent conflict 
accumulates. Others claim, however, that mediation should be initiated at an early stage of 
the conflict, before the adversaries cross a threshold of violence and begin to inflict heavy 
losses on each other (Edmead 1971). Prior to the outbreak of violence, and before the conflict 
has become too entrenched or the parties have become too inflexible, it is still possible to 
consider possibilities for peaceful settlement. In their analysis of 257 mediation attempts, 
Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991) find that the longer a dispute lasts, the less 
amenable it is to mediation.  
Other analysts repudiate the logic of ‘clock time’ and instead focus on ‘social’ or ‘event’ time 
(Lauer 1981). These thinkers assume a conflict is ripe for resolution if certain events that 
affect the perceptions and attitudes of disputants have occurred. For Zartman, a conflict is 
ripe for resolution when (1) a MHS exists, and (2) when the parties perceive a ‘way out’. 
Although a ripe moment can be created by outside parties if they are able to “cultivate the 
perception of a painful present versus a preferable alternative” (Zartman 2000, 229), if the 
parties refuse to recognise that they are in an impasse, a MHS has not occurred. The greater 
the objective evidence, the greater the likelihood that parties will perceive a painful 
stalemate. Again, this evidence is more likely to be apparent at a later stage of the conflict. In 
contrast to Zartman’s conception of a ripe moment, Stedman (1991) asserts that 
developments within the disputing parties are critical for the emergence of ripe moments. In 
his analysis, he argues that ripeness is a function of internal political changes within groups in 
conflict, such as the rise of new leaders or a split in a previously-unified leadership. 
That propitious timing is important is undeniable; however, when this intervention should 
occur remains the subject of heated debate. This thesis will explore the validity of the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: Multiparty mediations that occur at a later stage of an intractable conflict are more likely 
to be successful than those occurring at an earlier stage of the conflict.  
 
2.3 BEHAVIOURAL FACTORS 
Mediation outcome is also influenced by the mediators themselves. In particular, three 
mediator attributes are considered important: (1) (im)partiality, (2) leverage, and (3) 
legitimacy. These characteristics are usually held responsible for disputing parties’ 
acceptance of a mediator, which, in turn, is seen as vital for the successful performance of his 
functions (Kleiboer 1996, 368).  
 
2.3.1 IMPARTIALITY 
The issue of mediator impartiality is controversial amongst international mediation scholars. 
Conceptually, confusion exists because there is no scholarly consensus on the meaning of 
impartiality. The concept may refer to the intention, consequence or appearance of the 
mediator (Kriesberg 1982). Or, it may relate to a mediator’s attitudes toward the conflicting 
parties (Bjereld 1995). Other scholars contend that impartiality may refer to a mediator’s 
stake in the substance of the issues in conflict (Princen 1992), and yet others suggest that 
impartiality refers to both the mediator’s attitude and his stake in the issues (Kleiboer 1996). 
Analysts do agree however, that impartiality is essentially a matter of perception by the 
parties in conflict (Touval 1975; Bailey 1985).  
The debate on impartiality is not over conceptual issues, but rather over the effect of 
impartiality on the outcome of mediation. Conventional thesis highlights a mediators’ 
impartiality as essential for successful mediation (Young 1967; Northedge and Donelan 
1971; Burton and Dukes 1990). Supporters of this argument assume a direct link between 
mediator impartiality and mediation outcome: impartiality is crucial for securing disputants’ 
confidence in the mediator, which is a necessary condition for gaining his acceptability, 
which, in turn, is essential for mediation success to come about (Kleiboer 1996, 369).  
In contrast to this traditional approach, a number of analysts contend that a mediator does not 
need to be impartial to be successful (Touval 1975; Smith 1985; Zartman and Touval 1985). 
Instead, they tend towards accentuating the merits of a biased mediator. From the perspective 
of the disputants, a biased mediator may be an attractive option as long as the mediator has 
particularly strong ties to the party with greater control over the outcome of the conflict. 
Whatever partiality results from these ties is balanced by the mediator’s greater capacity to 
influence that party. The party that does not have any relations with the mediator thus expects 
the mediator to use his partiality to influence the adversary (Pruitt 1981). Many cases of 
international mediation efforts support this hypothesis: the Soviet Union’s efforts in the war 
between India and Pakistan; Algerian mediation between Iran and the US over the American 
hostages held in Iran in 1980; and the US mediation attempts in the Israeli-Lebanese 
negotiations in 1983. In all these cases, the mediator was accepted and considered successful 
despite his perceived alliance with one of the parties.  
A biased mediator may also be more adept at securing a successful mediation outcome 
because he may possess certain resources that are valued by the disputants (Zartman and 
Touval 1985). Analysts who support this argument assume that a mediator engages in 
behaviour designed to elicit information and exercise influence in order to reframe issues and 
persuade the parties to move in one direction or another. These tasks are best achieved not 
when a mediator is unbiased, but when he possesses resources that either or both parties 
value. Thus, in this view, effective mediation is the result of sufficient resources, not 
impartiality (Bercovitch 1986, 164). Bias is here defined as the perceived prejudice of a 
mediator in favour of or against one group compared with another, in a way considered by 
the parties to be unfair. 
This thesis will explore the validity of the following hypothesis: 
H2: Multiparty mediations in which the mediators are biased towards one of the disputants 
are more likely to be successful in an intractable conflict than those where the mediators are 
impartial.  
 
2.3.2 LEVERAGE 
Those who consider a biased mediator to be more capable of achieving a successful 
mediation outcome subordinate impartiality to the possession of leverage by a mediator. Few 
have sought to explicitly define leverage, but it generally seems to refer to a mediator’s 
ability to put pressure on one or both of the conflicting parties to accept a proposed 
settlement. This assumes that a mediator has power and influence resources that can be 
brought to bear on the parties. Analysts distinguish between ‘carrots’ (positive inducements) 
and ‘sticks’ (negative sanctions), and between material aspects (such as the possibility to 
withhold or supply economic aid) and immaterial aspects (the possibility to use moral or 
psychological pressure) (Zartman and Touval 1985; Princen 1992).  
In the absence of any systematic research on the impact of these various sources of leverage, 
the question of how important mediator leverage is for achieving successful mediation 
outcomes remains disputed. According to some authors (Bercovitch et al. 1991; Zartman and 
Touval 1996; Favretto 2009) leverage is a necessary condition for mediation success and is 
indispensible for persuading conflicting parties to make concessions or ensuring that 
disputants agree to the conditions of settlement. In contrast, other analysts (Yarrow 1978; 
Slim 1992) claim that, in certain instances, the mediator’s lack of political power may help 
facilitate success rather than hinder it. Yarrow (1978, 256), in particular, argues that the 
credibility and sincerity of a mediator may be enhanced “because of his non-political nature 
and inability to call down sanctions of any kind”. Furthermore, the possibility of mediator 
acceptance may increase when the mediator is strategically weak and therefore perceived as 
non-threatening and legitimate.  
 
2.3.3 LEGITIMACY 
A very important type of leverage is the level of legitimacy invested in the mediator. 
Carnevale (2002, 28) defines ‘legitimate power’ as “influence driven by a belief that the 
mediator has the right to prescribe behaviour, and derives from a norm that has been accepted 
by the disputants”. Legitimacy derives not only from a mediator’s personal reputation, track 
record, and expertise, but also from organisational factors such as their institutional and 
positional status (Kleiboer 1996, 372). The institutional status of a mediator stems from the 
identity of a mediator’s constituency. A mediator usually acts as a spokesman or 
representative of a national state or NGO. Thus, the legitimacy and, in some cases, leverage 
of these institutional bodies determines the status of the mediating representative (Rubin 
1981). The positional status of the mediator depends on his standing within his own country 
or organisation. He must have a strong internal position in order to commit his government or 
executive to back up his words or actions (Kleiboer 1996).   
Two competing propositions about the relations between mediator status and successful 
mediation outcome have been developed. The first asserts that the higher the mediator’s 
status, the greater the chances of success (Low 1985). The second assumes that for mediation 
to be successful, the status of the mediator and the status of the disputing parties’ 
representatives must be attuned: if the status of the mediator is lower than the representatives 
of the parties, mediation may not be taken seriously (Wolfers 1985). The leverage of a 
mediator, understood in terms of his personal legitimacy, has remained rather understudied in 
the mediation literature.  Thus, this research views leverage through the prism of the 
mediator’s personal legitimacy. It will explore the validity of the following hypothesis:  
H3: Multiparty mediations in which the mediators have personal leverage over the disputants 
are more likely to be successful in an intractable conflict than those which do not.  
 
2.4 PROCEDURAL FACTORS 
A procedural explanation considers the strategies a mediator employs. In the mediation 
literature, strategy is defined as “a broad plan of action designed to indicate which measures 
may be taken to achieve desired objectives in conflicts” (Bercovitch 2007, 113). Choosing an 
approach commensurate with the conflict the mediator becomes involved in is one of the pre-
requisites for successful mediation (Bercovitch 1991). The most common classification of 
mediator strategies is that developed by Zartman and Touval (1985), who distinguish 
between three principle types of strategy: (1) communication-facilitation, (2) formulation, 
and (3) manipulation. This typology is particularly useful as it “permits reasonably accurate 
distinctions between types of mediator behaviour and facilitates comparative empirical 
research on the effectiveness of different kinds of mediation strategies in international 
disputes” (Bercovitch and Wells 1993, 7).  
The mediator as ‘communicator’ serves as a channel of communication as contact between 
the parties in dispute breaks down. Communication strategies involve making contact with 
the parties, identifying issues and interests, clarifying the situation, and supplying missing 
information. Essentially, this strategy requires the mediator to act as a go-between to carry 
information, proposals, or concessions back and forth between the conflicting parties. The 
mediator as ‘formulator’ plays a more active role, helping the parties to redefine issues or to 
find a formula for the resolution of their conflict. Formulation tactics include controlling the 
pace and formality of meetings and the physical environment, suggesting procedures and 
establishing protocols, and keeping the parties at the table focused on the issues in dispute. If 
these strategies prove insufficient to resolve the conflict, the mediator as ‘manipulator’ may 
have to use his leverage to manipulate the parties into agreement. Manipulation strategies 
involve the mediator engaging in the parties’ decision-making process to change their 
expectations or press the parties to adopt more flexible negotiating positions. Manipulation 
strategies also require the mediator to take responsibility for concessions made and make the 
parties aware of the costs of failing to reach an agreement (Bercovitch and Wells 1993, 7-8).  
Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991, 16) empirically analysed the relationship between 
mediator strategy and mediation success and concluded that more active mediation strategies 
produce more effective international mediations, and can affect and be responsive to a wider 
variety of dispute situations than less active strategies. In contrast, the premature use of active 
strategies is not without risks, and may ruin the mediator’s credibility and acceptability. As 
Kochan (1981, 126) argues, when conditions are not ripe for settlement, a mediator should 
refrain from active or directive tactics. To determine which conclusion is more accurate in the 
context of intractable conflicts, this thesis will explore the validity of the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: Multiparty mediations which involve a manipulative strategy are more likely to be 
successful in an intractable conflict than those where less directive strategies are used.  
 
2.5 METHODOLOGY 
By exploring the validity of propitious timing (H1), mediator bias (H2), mediator leverage 
(H3) and mediator strategy (H4), this research seeks to solve the puzzle of why the mediation 
process which led to the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland was 
successful, while the 2005-2007 Ahtisaari process to determine Kosovo’s final status ended 
in failure.  
The cases were selected based on two criteria. The first is that a particular conflict was 
managed by multiple mediators. The second criterion implies the existence of both 
hypothesised X and outcome Y (Beach and Pedersen 2012), which in this thesis means the 
existence (or not) of the aforementioned variables and (un-) successful mediation outcome. 
The relevance of Northern Ireland and Kosovo is two-fold: first, the conflict in Northern 
Ireland was, until the mid-1990s, deemed impossible to solve and commentators believed the 
country was doomed to suffer from perpetual conflict. Thus, the fact that a peace agreement 
was successfully negotiated implies that there are lessons to be drawn from Northern 
Ireland’s mediation experience. Second, the mediation effort in Kosovo was undoubtedly a 
failure. It is therefore fruitful to analyse the mistakes of the past in order to guide future 
mediation efforts.   
 
2.5.1 THE CASE STUDY APPROACH 
The basis for choosing a case study method can be found in its practicality: case studies offer 
a valuable way to test hypotheses and develop theories, by enabling the researcher to examine 
the operation of causal mechanisms in individual cases in detail in order to provide historical 
explanations of cases (George and Bennett 2005, 21). Although this approach trades 
theoretical parsimony for explanatory richness, in international relations “only case studies 
provide the intensive empirical analysis that can find previously unnoticed causal factors and 
historical patterns” (Achen and Snidal 1989, 167-68).  
 
2.5.2 PROCESS-TRACING METHOD 
The only methodological approach which permits a serious analysis of causal mechanisms is 
process-tracing, which entails “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the 
causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable, or variables, and the 
outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005, 206; Beach and Pedersen 
2012). Careful description is fundamental to successful process-tracing, as the method 
analyses trajectories of change and causation by closely studying the independent, dependent 
and intervening variables that provide sufficient support for what was hypothesised. It is 
therefore an appropriate method to employ alongside a case study approach. 
 
2.5.3 MILL’S METHOD OF DIFFERENCE 
After conducting process-tracing on the sequential processes within the cases, this research 
will use Mill’s ‘method of difference’ to explain the success of Northern Ireland’s mediation 
process and the failure of Kosovo’s. This approach compares two cases with antithetical 
outcomes, and allows the researcher to employ “the logic of elimination to exclude as a 
candidate cause (independent variable) for the variance in the outcome (dependent variable) 
any condition that is present in both cases” (George and Bennett 2005, 156). Mill himself 
recognised that conditions that are not present in both cases can generally only be regarded as 
possibly causally associated with the variance in case outcomes, for these conditions may not 
be present in other cases with the same outcome. This thesis avoids the dilemma of a ‘false 
positive’ as its purports only to explain the outcome of two mediation processes, rather than 
to use the cases to make generalisations as to the causes of success or failure in mediation 
processes in general.   
Using the previously formulated variables, this research continues with an analysis of the two 
case studies. Each chapter follows a systematic structure which provides an in-depth analysis 
of the events leading up to the final mediation outcome. To test the first hypothesis, the 
analysis will consider the failure of earlier mediation efforts in order to determine whether 
they failed because the conflict was not yet ripe for settlement. To test the validity of the 
second and third hypotheses, this research will study the parties’ perceptions of the mediator 
and their reaction to his authority. Finally, to test the fourth hypothesis, the analysis will 
consider the mediators’ process, issues, and timing strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
For more than a generation, Northern Ireland was a byword for sectarian conflict, terrorism, 
and civil disobedience. In November 1995, the heads of the British and Irish governments 
appointed former US Senator George Mitchell as head of a commission to propose a way out 
of the impasse which had thus far characterised their attempts to end the conflict. Mitchell 
faced the unenviable task of having to reconcile parties who, against the backdrop of a long 
and bitter conflict, had become entrenched in their positions and unwilling to compromise. 
He inherited a situation in which extremists dominated the dialogue, where compromise was 
denounced as ethnic betrayal, and where the social fabric of the country’s two deeply 
segregated communities had been torn to shreds. Despite the gravity of the task, a political 
settlement was reached on 10 April 1998. 
Seasoned analysts repeatedly observed throughout the early 1990s that, while real peace 
might be possible in the Middle East (in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords) and South Africa 
(after the end of apartheid), it was probably impossible in Ulster (Cox 1997). The purpose of 
this chapter is to determine how, given this context, the mediation process resulted in an 
agreement. It first offers an overview of the nature of the conflict by studying the sources of 
its intractability. It then considers why previous attempts at reaching a settlement failed, 
before contemplating the series of events which led to the creation of a ripe moment for 
negotiations. From this, it moves on to consider the mediation process itself, paying particular 
attention to Mitchell’s strategy and his personal characteristics.   
Ultimately, the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (GFA) responded to unique conditions in one 
divided society. It came about thanks to a particular conjunction of circumstances, and as 
such, it is not a foolproof blueprint for achieving success in other mediation efforts. 
Nevertheless, lessons can be drawn from the manner in which this historic deal was achieved.  
 
3.1.1 SOURCES OF INTRACTABILITY  
It is difficult to determine exactly where to begin an account of the process that gave rise to 
Northern Ireland’s conflict. Some commentators (Cairns and Darby 1998; Edwards and 
McGrattan 2010) revert to the Plantation of Ulster, beginning in 1606, to understand the 
conflict’s roots. The Plantation introduced to the northernmost province of Ireland a 
community of foreigners (mainly Scots) who spoke a different language and practiced a 
different religion. By the eighteenth century, the colonists occupied 95 percent of the 
province, and came to form a majority in Ulster in contrast to a Catholic majority in the rest 
of the island. Years of oppression by the colonists and rebellion by the natives culminated in 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921), which partitioned the island of Ireland into two regions: the 
six, predominantly Protestant counties of the North remained part of the UK to be governed 
by an Assembly based in Stormont; the twenty-six, overwhelmingly Catholic counties of the 
South were granted independence and became the Irish Free State (later the Republic of 
Ireland). The partition did not put an end to the violence however, as the native Irish, who 
believed that their land had been stolen, became determined to bring about a united Ireland, 
free from British influence, a goal which conflicted with the chronically insecure Protestant 
majority’s desire to remain part of Britain to avoid becoming a minority community in a 
unified Ireland. The broad outlines of the conflict were thus established.  
It was the ‘unionists’ desire not to be subsumed in a united Catholic state that pushed them, 
through political, social and economic policies, to cement their majority at the expense of 
Northern Ireland’s remaining Catholic ‘nationalists’. The system used to elect ministers to 
Stormont was reformed in 1925, with the initial proportional electoral system replaced by a 
majoritarian, first-past-the-post arrangement. In itself, this meant that nationalists could 
expect to gain no more than ten or twelve of the fifty-two parliamentary seats at any election. 
The situation was further exacerbated by gerrymandering to ensure Unionist majorities 
(Edwards and McGrattan 2010, 4). The already-alienated, and increasingly disengaged, 
Catholic minority’s situation was made worse by the bureaucratic structures of the Northern 
Irish state, which institutionalised ethnic bias in the distribution of housing and welfare 
services, and employment, for fear of Catholic infiltration (Mulholland, 2002; Darby 2003).  
The emergence of socialist politics in Britain in the aftermath of the Second World War 
affected Northern Ireland’s political culture. The main consequence of the establishment of 
the welfare state was that it gave Catholics an incentive to participate in the structures of the 
Northern Irish state for the first time (Edwards and McGrattan 2010, 9). Over time, these 
tangible benefits, as well as growing material prosperity, influenced Catholic calls for greater 
civil rights in the 1960s. The Catholic social movement was met with violence by loyalists 
and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which, in turn, prompted violent retaliations by 
nationalists and republicans. Escalating civil disobedience led the British government to 
deploy the army on the streets of Northern Ireland to try to quell the unrest. In 1972, 
frustrated at the inability of Northern Ireland’s politicians to re-establish control, the British 
government suspended the devolved parliament and imposed direct rule. These events 
marked the beginning of ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland.  
 
3.1.2 ‘THE TROUBLES’ 
In the aftermath of the British army’s deployment, the nationalist campaign for more 
equitable treatment through reform of the Northern Irish state was subordinated to the need to 
remove the British presence and unify with the rest of Ireland (Darby 2003). The idea now 
was to ‘take the war to the Brits’. Militant republicanism, in the form of the Provisional IRA, 
emerged from the increasingly politicised and assertive Catholic minority, which firmly 
believed that it had a moral right to take up arms. The rise of republicanism in turn prompted 
violence from Protestant loyalist militants.  
The patterns of violence changed throughout the period of the Troubles. The late 1960s and 
early 1970s were largely characterised by inter-communal rioting, which was replaced 
gradually, though not completely, by a triangular low-intensity conflict in which bombings, 
targeted assassinations, and random sectarian killings became the main tactical approaches. 
Despite the fragmented and sporadic nature of the violence, very few families were left 
untouched by ‘the Troubles’. In absolute terms, almost 4000 deaths appears relatively small; 
proportionally however, it translates to around 500,000 in the US – ten times the number of 
Americans killed in Vietnam (Edwards and McGrattan 2010, xviii). Around 40,000 other 
people were seriously wounded as a direct result of hostilities. The indirect effects of the 
Troubles are less easily quantifiable, but they include the deepening of inter-communal 
mistrust, fear, and hatred; the perpetuation of old grievances and the creation of new ones; 
high levels of unemployment; a decline in inward investment and tourism; and the emigration 
of young, highly educated people.  
Thus, a comprehensive political, social and economic campaign of discrimination undertaken 
by the deeply insecure Protestant majority in Northern Ireland ultimately created an untenable 
situation. Over time, relationships between the two communities deteriorated to such an 
extent that violence replaced dialogue as the method for pursuing political change.  
 
3.2 THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 
The two broad ‘nationalist’ and ‘unionist’ communities had various internal divisions. The 
nationalist camp was dominated by the SDLP, which emphasised non-violent reform and 
supported power-sharing within Northern Ireland as well as institutionalised links between 
the North and the Republic, and Sinn Fein – the political wing of the IRA – which was 
committed to forcing a British military withdrawal and reunifying Ireland. Unionists were 
divided between the UUP and the more militant DUP. Unlike the clear-cut ideological split 
on the nationalist side, “differences between the unionist parties tended to be expressive 
rather than substantive” (Coakley 2008, 101). Both parties were divided internally between 
partisans of devolved government for Northern Ireland and supporters of complete 
integration with Great Britain (Coakley 2008). These two blocs dominated electoral politics, 
contributing to entrenched positions and ultimately, political stalemate.  
 
3.3 PREVIOUS SETTLEMENT ATTEMPTS 
The political settlement which finally brought an end to almost three decades of violence was 
not achieved until 1998, yet the mediation effort was not the first attempt made by the parties 
to reach a settlement. Between 1974 and the ceasefires of 1994 there were seven attempts to 
reach a political and constitutional settlement. All of the initiatives were London-led and all 
floundered in the face of local opposition. The two most significant agreements were the 
Sunningdale Agreement (1973) and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985).  
 
3.3.1 THE SUNNINGDALE AGREEMENT 
The introduction of direct rule in 1972 was only intended to be temporary measure to take 
charge of the situation. The government therefore needed to develop an alternative system of 
government acceptable to both communities. In 1972 and 1973 it published ‘The Future of 
Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion” as well as constitutional proposals for the 
province. This white paper proposed a 78-member Assembly, to be elected by proportional 
representation. The British government would retain control over law, order, and finance, 
while a Council of Ireland – composed of members of the Republic of Ireland’s executive, 
the Northern Ireland Executive, and the Northern Ireland Assembly – would act in a 
consultative role. New elections were held on 28 June 1973, and pro-agreement parties won a 
clear majority of the seats. Nevertheless, republicans boycotted the elections and the IRA 
continued its violent campaign.  
Between 6 and 9 December 1973, representatives of the British and Irish governments and of 
the parties involved in the executive met to discuss the process for setting up the Council of 
Ireland. The provisions foresaw closer cooperation in security-related matters, and the 
possibility of a future devolution of powers from Westminster to the Northern Ireland 
assembly and the Council of Ireland (Wolff 2002). Unionists feared that any influence by the 
Republic of Ireland over Northern affairs represented a step closer to a united Ireland. A 
general election in February 1974 turned into a referendum on power sharing and the Council 
of Ireland. Opponents of any change to the status quo united in a coalition – the United Ulster 
Unionist Council (UUUC) and won 51 percent of the vote and eleven of the twelve Northern 
Irish seats at Westminster. When a motion against power sharing and the Council of Ireland 
was defeated in the Northern Ireland assembly, the newly established Ulster Workers’ 
Council (UWC) called for a general strike. Two weeks of strikes brought Northern Ireland to 
a near-complete standstill. The failure of the Northern Ireland executive to end the strike led 
to its resignation. The assembly was suspended two days later (Wolff 2002, 5-6).  
Why was it that a 1973 agreement that addressed essentially the same issues as the GFA 
addressed almost twenty-five years later failed? Sunningdale demanded significant 
compromises from all its signatories. However, despite the language of compromise, few if 
any of the parties were ready or willing to move as far or as speedily as the arrangement 
required in order for it to take root. Against a backdrop of continuing IRA violence, unionist 
leaders became increasingly vulnerable to pressure from the wider unionist community. For 
the parties, Sunningdale represented “an agreement too soon” (Farren 2007). 
 
3.3.2 AFTER SUNNINGDALE 
After the failure of Sunningdale, the British government developed and implemented a 
number of programmes aimed at economic development and improving community relations 
in Northern Ireland (Wolff 2002, 8). The government also introduced several initiatives to 
establish a new constitutional status for Northern Ireland. Seeking to learn from the lessons of 
Sunningdale, they were either strictly limited to Northern Ireland itself (such as, the 1974/75 
constitutional convention), or, when they had cross border implications, they did not involve 
any Northern Irish political parties (for example, the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council 
set up in 1981). None were successful.  
 
3.3.3 THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 
The British and Irish governments both desired to stabilise the situation in the North: the Irish 
wished to prevent a spillover of the conflict, whilst the British realised that it could not solve 
the conflict without Ireland’s support. Based on these considerations both governments 
entered into new negotiations, resulting in the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) (hereafter, ‘the 
Agreement’). The Agreement gave the Irish government an advisory role in Northern 
Ireland’s government while confirming that there would be no change in the constitutional 
position of Northern Ireland unless a majority of voters agreed, democratically, to join the 
Republic.  
Despite these provisions, the Agreement was roundly condemned by both sides of the 
conflict. Unionists rejected it because it gave the Republic a role in the governance of 
Northern Ireland, which to them represented the beginning of a process edging Northern 
Ireland into a united Ireland. Republicans likewise rejected the Agreement because it 
confirmed Northern Ireland’s constitutional status as part of the UK and in doing so, formally 
recognised the partition of Ireland. The lack of popular support condemned this Agreement to 
failure. Again, the parties were not ready to compromise. The conflict was still not ripe for 
resolution. 
Although the Agreement failed to break the political stalemate, it did indicate that solutions 
were possible to which the two governments and a significant proportion of the nationalist 
community could agree (Wolff 2002, 10). Furthermore, it undermined the more extreme 
factions on both sides: it made uncompromising, hard-line unionism appear a less-credible 
strategy for preserving Northern Ireland’s link with the UK, and it indicated that there was 
overwhelming support for constitutional, non-violent politics within the nationalist 
community (Wolff 2002). Changes in the international environment helped the parties build 
upon this growing consensus and stimulated efforts to reach a settlement in the 1990s.  
 
3.4 THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Accounts of the process leading to the IRA ceasefire of 1994, and the possibility for 
negotiations which this entailed, have too often failed to relate these events to other changes 
taking place in the wider world. By considering the two principal means by which the conflict 
was ‘internationalised’ – ‘Europeanization’ and the end of the Cold War – this research seeks 
to rectify this error. 
The transformation of the border as a physical and symbolic divide has been integrally 
connected to the role of the EU: the European project indirectly helped to nullify the border’s 
impact as a line of dispute between two states (Hayward 2011, 31). Through both countries’ 
membership of the EU (at the time, the European Economic Community) Britain and Ireland 
were able to identify and build common ground in many policy areas. The good working 
relationship that developed between British Prime Minister John Major and his Irish 
counterpart, Albert Reynolds, paved the way for the ‘Downing Street Declaration’ of 1993. 
This declaration affirmed for the first time the right of the people of Ireland to self-
determination, and stated that Northern Ireland would be transferred to the Republic of 
Ireland if a majority of its population voted for such a move. It also stated that the British 
government had “no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland”. The 
declaration proved essential in preparing the way for the paramilitary ceasefires in 1994 and 
multiparty talks thereafter. 
Prior to the ‘Europeanization’ of the Northern Ireland conflict, republicans viewed the Irish 
problem almost entirely in terms of Britain and the British presence. However, as cooperative 
relations between the two countries became more entrenched, many in Ireland – including the 
majority of constitutional nationalists – saw the British less as a malign force and more as a 
partner with whom any elected Irish government would have to work in order to resolve the 
situation in Northern Ireland (Cox 1997, 690).  
Whilst the EU’s involvement in the conflict was relatively constrained, major changes in the 
international environment led the US, under President Clinton, to adopt a far greater interest 
in the conflict. A Cold War-driven ‘special relationship’ with Britain meant that successive 
US administrations had been content to regard the conflict as an internal affair for the UK 
government. However, with the end of the Cold War, the international system was radically 
overhauled.  
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact fundamentally altered the global framework within which 
the IRA campaign had hitherto been conducted (Cox 1997). For a number of years, the IRA 
justified its actions by claiming that it was part of a global revolutionary struggle against the 
forces of imperialism (Cox 1997). However, with the defeat of a number of anti-imperialist 
movements, these claims no longer sounded credible. As the tide of anti-imperialism ebbed, 
the republican movement increasingly lacked purpose. Logistically the IRA could fight on, 
but the capacity to “continue killing people in Britain and Ireland in a campaign that seemed 
to be going nowhere” was “hardly the same as being part of a broader international 
movement whose goal was the liberation of humanity from the oppressive grip of 
imperialism” (Cox 1997, 682).  
Together therefore, the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the wider 
revolutionary project created a set of international conditions which made an IRA ceasefire 
feasible. To act on these conditions required the parties to perceive that the path of the bomb 
and the gun was leading nowhere and that their interests would be better served through 
negotiations.    
 
3.5 THE PARTIES’ REAPPRAISAL OF THE CONFLICT 
The main dynamism for the Northern Irish peace process came from within the republican 
movement, whose change in strategy was facilitated by an auspicious international 
environment and the involvement of a somewhat sympathetic US administration. 
Additionally, a change in the make-up of the British and Irish governments also helped 
capitalise on the IRA ceasefire and push the peace process forward.  
 
3.5.1 THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY 
Since the late 1980s an internal debate within the IRA had been taking place between those 
who favoured a continuation of the organisation’s militant campaign to force a British 
withdrawal, and those who believed that a suspension of hostilities, followed by negotiations, 
would be more fruitful (MacGinty 1998). In the early stages of the conflict, militant 
republicans had overly optimistic assumptions about the possibilities of victory over the 
enemy. By the late 1980s, however, republicans recognised that the British had successfully 
reduced the conflict to Irish people killing each other (Adams in Hennessey 2000). 
Furthermore, in the early years of the 1990s, loyalist paramilitaries began ‘out-killing’ the 
IRA for the first time in the conflict’s history, generating a sense that the IRA’s ‘armed 
struggle’ had become “trapped in a sectarian cul-de-sac” (Bew and Frampton 2012, 295). The 
republican leadership thus came to the conclusion that their position was diminishing and 
sought to exploit the ‘escape hatch’ offered by the peace process.  
The failure of the IRA’s original scenario of a quick victory precipitated a major crisis in the 
organisation, one result of which was to relocate power in the movement from southern 
‘traditionalists’ to northern ‘radicals’ (Cox 1997, 679). The new leadership was determined to 
broaden the base of the movement at home while extending its range of contacts abroad, 
particularly within the Irish community in North America. A number of Irish-American 
entrepreneurs had become significant players in corporate America, and as an aspiring 
presidential candidate, Clinton had forged a close alliance with the Irish-American lobby. The 
lobby was increasingly aware that a unique set of conditions for an IRA ceasefire were falling 
into place, and pressed Clinton to make a number of commitments on Ireland both during and 
after his presidential campaign. The Irish-American lobby was convinced that a visit by 
Gerry Adams to the US would strengthen his standing, both internationally and within the 
IRA. In January 1994, against the advice of the State Department, the CIA and the FBI, 
Clinton personally sanctioned a visa for Adams to visit the US. This decision was of 
enormous importance for the peace process: first, it gave republicans a glimpse of the 
benefits which constitutional legitimacy offered; second, it endorsed Adams’ leadership of 
Sinn Fein and helped him in his internal negotiations with extremist republicans; finally, by 
letting republicans know that they had ‘friends in high places’, whom they could easily lose if 
they failed to deliver peace, it put further pressure on the IRA to implement a ceasefire (Cox 
1997, 687).  
Although Clinton’s decision to grant Adams a visa enraged the British government and 
provoked unionist protests that America was part of a pan-nationalist front, the 
administration’s subsequent behaviour and the President’s visit to Ireland significantly 
changed the feeling among most unionists that America’s agenda was exclusively nationalist. 
The White House refused to intervene in the political process on the nationalists’ behalf, and 
instead encouraged the joint efforts of both governments. Fundamentally, access to the White 
House required Adams to agree to place decommissioning on the agenda of any talks with the 
British, an issue which had thus far prevented serious talks from taking place. 
Ultimately, the collapse of the global anti-imperialist movement, of which the IRA claimed to 
be a part, made it increasingly difficult for the organisation to legitimise a strategy which, by 
the late 1980s, had effectively reached a dead end. Furthermore, the opportunities given to 
the IRA by the US offered the organisation a ‘way out’. For the republican movement, the 
two necessary conditions for a mutually hurting stalemate had been met, over twenty years 
after the conflict began (H1).  
 
3.5.2 THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS 
Despite the IRA ceasefire, the British government still had good reason to adopt a cautious 
approach. During the course of the Troubles, Britain had lost hundreds of its soldiers, seen 
some of its major cities blown up, and had its international reputation tarnished. Furthermore, 
the IRA had, on two occasions, attempted to kill Conservative leaders. This inevitably shaped 
its attitude towards ‘doing a deal’ with Sinn Fein and the IRA. Furthermore, including Sinn 
Fein in the peace process would create an enormous political headache for the Conservatives, 
who were increasingly dependent upon the unionist parties’ votes to pass legislation in 
Westminster. The process thus reached an impasse. In retaliation for Major’s perceived 
intransigence, the IRA ended its ceasefire in February 1996. 
In 1997, the Labour Party under Tony Blair was elected with a large parliamentary majority. 
Blair prioritised the peace process and “cleared the table of the wreckage of the past 
negotiations and deprived the republican movement of excuses for violence” (Barnes and 
Kent 1999, 34). He sought to draw Sinn Fein into the process and dropped the demand for 
prior decommissioning. The IRA declared another ceasefire on 20 July 1997, and Sinn Fein 
entered peace talks on 9 September 1997. The process further benefited from the 1997 Irish 
elections, in which the Fianna Fáil party, led by Bertie Ahern, triumphed over the incumbent 
Fine Gael. Fianna Fáil was the party traditionally associated with the ideals of republicanism 
and was thus able to deal more decisively with the republican movement (Barnes and Kent 
1999, 34).  
The preceding analysis has highlighted the multiple events which together created an 
environment conducive to successful peace negotiations. That it took thirty years of violence 
before the parties were able to successfully resolve their differences intuitively lends 
credence to the first hypothesis that mediations occurring later in a conflict are more likely to 
be successful because parties have had the opportunity to exhaust all other avenues and 
realise that negotiations offer the only way forward. The analysis has further shown both how 
the IRA’s perception of the conflict changed, and how it understood negotiations as offering 
a ‘way out’ of the conflict. Similarly, for the British, whose international reputation was 
being severely damaged by continued conflict, negotiations presented an opportunity to 
resolve the conflict permanently. The study now continues with an analysis of the mediation 
process.  
 
3.6 THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS 
In the final months of the Conservative government, moves towards peace were initiated. 
However, given their reliance on the unionist votes, the Conservatives pushed for IRA 
decommissioning as a precondition for Sinn Fein’s entry into the talks. This created an 
impasse, which was only resolved after the appointment of Senator George Mitchell 
(alongside General John de Chastelain and Harri Holkeri) to chair a commission to propose a 
way out. In January 1996, the Mitchell Commission recommended that decommissioning 
occur in tandem with the peace process. Elections to a Forum were held in order to 
democratically determine the proportional representation of the parties to the talks. This 
move already contrasted with past attempts to reach a settlement amongst the elites: elections 
ensured a process grounded in inclusion. After the elections, Mitchell and his co-chairs were 
invited to preside over the peace process. Senator Mitchell’s appointment not only 
underscored the depth of American involvement in the peace process, but also provided the 
body with gravitas. The Forum was able to gain the confidence of all major political actors, 
except the DUP.  
 
3.6.1 THE MEDIATOR 
Despite the hope generated by the IRA’s ceasefire, Mitchell and his co-chairmen faced 
numerous hurdles. In order to succeed, they needed to find a way to bridge the chasm 
between the parties who steadfastly refused to talk to each other and bring the delegates 
together in a manner that would allow them to communicate with each other and forge an 
ultimate agreement. Mitchell endeavoured to create a ‘winning coalition of the centre against 
the extremes’ (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 4).  
Mitchell himself was an experienced and qualified mediator, and having served six years as 
Majority Leader in the US Senate, was ideally suited to dealing with intractable negotiations 
between parties with seemingly irreconcilable differences. From his dealings in the Senate, 
Mitchell understood that the immediate pursuit of instant success would, most often, yield 
neither success nor a satisfactory outcome. His background not only made him ideally suited 
for the Northern Ireland situation, but it also guided his strategy and choices.  
 
3.6.2 THE TALKS 
The chairmen and the delegates faced tough issues, including the nature of the future 
relationship with the UK, the structure of a proposed Northern Ireland Assembly, the powers 
of cross-border entities, and the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. Furthermore, the 
chairmen faced immense procedural barriers: the process for negotiations had not been 
defined or accepted, and no agenda or rules of order had been established (Curran and 
Sebenius 2003, 15). These procedures would have to be developed before the delegates could 
begin discussing substantive issues. The chairmen had not been granted any formal powers to 
sanction or reward delegates, and they had no resources or tangible means of influence, 
making it difficult for them to credibly threaten to impose meaningful deadlines on the 
proceedings (H3). Mitchell therefore relied on “the power of persuasion” (Germond and 
Witcover 1998), and the mediating coalition depended on the parties’ trust and respect to 
achieve progress. Drawing on Curran and Sebenius (2003), I argue that Mitchell’s approach 
to the talks had three major components: a process strategy, an issues strategy, and a timing 
strategy. 
 
3.6.3 THE PROCESS STRATEGY 
Mitchell’s initial focus for the All-Party Talks was instrumental to their successful resolution. 
Instead of pressing the delegates to bridge their differences on substantive issues (such as 
decommissioning and political arrangements) early on in the process, Mitchell chose to steer 
the discussions almost exclusively through procedural issues (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 16). 
It took the parties three months, from June to August 1996, to establish the ‘ground rules’ for 
discussing procedures. It then took over a year of negotiations to establish procedures and an 
agenda, and then a further five months (from October 1997 to March 1998) to develop 
preliminary issue statements and outlines for agreement. Nevertheless, given the highly 
polarised environment, an early focus on highly toxic issues would have likely pushed the 
parties even further apart. 
The strategy adopted by Mitchell and his co-chairs stressed inclusion, legitimacy and consent. 
The ‘Mitchell Principles’ – the preconditions to participate in the talks – emphasised the 
importance of these ideals, and committed parties to resolving their issues through dialogue 
and democratic, non-violent means. Discussion of adherence to these principles provided a 
set of criteria that would “later bind members of a coalition of the centre and distinguish them 
from their more extreme counterparts” (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 18). Ultimately, while 
Mitchell and his co-chairs had significant influence over participation, the two sponsoring 
governments formally maintained the powers of inclusion and exclusion to the talks. This 
was useful for Mitchell, as he could be seen as impartial (H2). 
Mitchell also embraced the rule of ‘sufficient consensus’ in the procedural debates, which 
was intended to guarantee that any measures adopted by the parties at the talks had genuinely 
broad support. While the rule sacrificed efficiency for consent, it ensured that the outcome of 
the talks could not reflect a one-sided victory for one faction or another. Despite weeks of 
debate over procedures, it appeared unlikely that the delegates were going to be able to agree 
on a set of rules before the August 1996 recess. In an attempt to move the process forward, 
DUP delegates proposed that the participants vote on the proposed rules in sections and as a 
complete package, using the sufficient consensus formula. This strategy allowed smaller 
parties to save face with their constituents, by effectively enabling them to cast a negative 
vote on every section, but still vote in favour of the entire package of rules.  
Over time, and with the consent of the participants to do so, the independent chairmen moved 
from their initial communication strategy to adopt a management and facilitative role (Touval 
and Zartman 1985). The gradual process solidified Mitchell’s authority and strengthened the 
trust and commitment of the parties to the process (H4). Now in a position to better control 
the process, the chairmen used ‘variable geometry’ to strengthen the mediation effort. In July 
1996, at the peak of Northern Ireland’s marching season, violence threatened to jeopardise 
the talks. However, Mitchell adapted the size and format of the meetings, and substituted 
plenary sessions with a series of smaller meetings where limited subsets of the parties met to 
discuss the agenda and rules of procedure (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 20). This approach 
enabled the parties to remain in the talks even in the midst of the sectarian violence which 
characterised the summer marching season.  
At all costs, Mitchell kept the majority of parties committed to negotiations (the DUP and the 
UKUP left the talks after Sinn Fein’s entry in September 1997). In response to unionist 
concerns about Sinn Fein’s participation in the talks before the IRA had initiated 
decommissioning, an independent commission was set up by the British and Irish 
governments – headed by Mitchell – to verify decommissioning and establish a timeline. This 
ultimately reassured the moderate unionists that decommissioning remained a core concern 
for the mediators and the governments, yet could no longer act as an impediment to talks.   
Mitchell also adeptly presented a facade of progress to the media raising expectations of 
success. For the parties, this increased constituency pressures and raised the costs of being a 
spoiler; it also isolated those who argued against the process. When the extremist parties 
turned to violent opposition, Mitchell successfully reframed their actions, to depict them not 
as evidence of the failure of negotiations, but rather as evidence of their success (Mitchell 
1999, 142).  
The chairmen’s initial focus on procedures provided the parties with an opportunity to listen 
to other viewpoints and develop at least a rudimentary understanding of each others’ 
positions and interests. It also allowed the parties to vent their anger at the process rather than 
at each other, preventing them from becoming entrenched in their positions and refusing to 
compromise. Mitchell’s decision to focus on the process of the talks also gave him time to 
solidify his authority and develop new options (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 17). 
 
3.6.4 THE ISSUE STRATEGY 
Alongside their focus on procedures, the mediators pursued an ‘issue strategy’ to respond to 
the parties’ incompatibility on particular substantive issues. The establishment of the 
‘Independent Commission on Decommissioning’ that kept the unionists in the talks enabled 
Mitchell to decouple the issue of decommissioning from the negotiations, and push the 
negotiations forward.  
Mitchell’s second strategy for dealing with the parties’ incompatibility followed the approach 
suggested by the SDLP to divide the major issues into three ‘Strands’ which could be 
separately negotiated and later repackaged into a final deal. ‘Strand 1’ dealt with internal 
relations in Northern Ireland. ‘Strand 2’ dealt with ‘North-South’ relations, and involved the 
creation of joint institutions. ‘Strand 3’ dealt with relations between the British and Irish 
governments with respect to Northern Ireland.  
The final agreement established an Assembly with constitutional powers (unionist provision) 
and ‘parallel consent’ power-sharing arrangements1 (nationalist provision); created a North-
South Ministerial Council (nationalists) with a ‘mutual destruction’ provision which 
stipulated that the Assembly and cross-border institutions could not function independently 
(mutual); and changed the Irish constitution (unionists) and British constitutional law 
(nationalists) to enshrine the concept of ‘self-determination’ for the people of Northern 
Ireland. The final package could be supported by a broad coalition of parties and, 
importantly, could be sold to the parties’ constituencies as a victory.  
Although the parties’ positions on these issues were initially strongly opposed, Mitchell’s 
decision to discuss each separately before refining the options created an overall package 
that, taken as a whole, was arguably better than a no-deal alternative (Curran and Sebenius 
2003, 25).   
 
                                                 
1
 The ‘parallel consent’ formula requires at least 50 percent of the members of a Legislative Assembly to vote 
in favour of a motion. Of this, at least 50 percent of the motion’s support must come from unionists and 50 
percent from nationalists.  
3.6.5 THE TIMING STRATEGY 
Given the bitterness of the Troubles, for the parties to develop a working relationship and 
take steps to bridge the gulf that separated them required an extraordinarily patient approach. 
Furthermore, the mediators’ inability to impose sanctions or offer tangible rewards, forced 
them to commit to an ‘as long as it takes’ strategy, rather than attempting to prematurely 
drive the parties to a deal – an approach unlikely to achieve any sort of accommodation 
between the parties. Thus, for almost two years the negotiations moved tentatively forward, 
but in April 1998, Mitchell set a deadline of May for negotiations to be completed and 
subsequently “shepherded explicit ‘substantive’ negotiations toward resolution in a mere two 
weeks” (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 16).  
Over the course of the negotiations, Mitchell had painstakingly built enormous personal 
credibility with the parties. He had made a visible and costly commitment to the process and 
had repeatedly demonstrated his “scrupulous commitment to an even-handed approach and 
patient impartiality” (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 28). In early 1996, for example, his initial 
proposal on parallel decommissioning put him at odds with the unionists and Britain, but 
ingratiated him with the nationalists. In July 1996, his acceptance of the DUP proposal for 
voting based on sufficient consensus cut against the nationalists, but demonstrated his 
impartiality and desire to reach a mutually-acceptable conclusion (H2). Mitchell used his 
personal credibility, and the sense of obligation that the parties felt towards him, to push the 
parties towards agreement. 
 
3.7 THE BELFAST/GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT 
The GFA has six main constitutional provisions. First, Northern Ireland’s future 
constitutional status will be determined by a majority of its people. Second, “it is for the 
people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to 
exercise their right of self-determination to bring about a united Ireland”. Third, while 
recognising that a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland wish for a united 
Ireland, the present wish of the majority is to maintain the Union; accordingly, Northern 
Ireland’s constitutional position would remain within the UK. Fourth, if, in the future, the 
people of Ireland exercise their right to self-determination, both Governments are bound to 
introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish. 
Fifth, the governments affirm that whichever sovereign government has jurisdiction in 
Northern Ireland, their power will be exercised with “rigorous impartiality and founded on 
the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights”. 
Finally, Northern Ireland’s citizens have the right to identify themselves and be accepted as 
Irish or British, or both. 
In May 1998 a referendum was held in Northern Ireland to vote on the Agreement. With a 
turnout of 81 percent, 71 percent of the votes cast were in favour of the Agreement (ESRC 
2001). In the Republic, the electorate voted to amend the Irish constitution in line with the 
Agreement. 56 percent of the electorate voted, with 94 percent of the votes in favour of 
amending the Constitution (ESRC 2001).  
 
3.8 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
As this chapter has comprehensively demonstrated, the successful resolution of Northern 
Ireland’s conflict was brought about by a unique combination of internal factors and changes 
in the external environment. Nevertheless lessons can still be drawn from the mediation 
process. The third parties’ attempts to mediate the conflict are instructive: first, propitious 
timing is of great importance – in this case, the end of the Cold War, heightened US interest, 
and the diminution of the importance of borders, fundamentally altered the context of the 
conflict, and forced the parties to re-evaluate their strategies, interests and positions. 
Furthermore, the failure of previous agreements occurred because the conflict was not yet 
‘ripe’. There is, therefore, sufficient evidence to support the first hypothesis that mediation 
processes which occur later in a conflict, once the parties have been presented with 
indisputable objective evidence that they are in a MHS situation, are more likely to be 
successful. Second, Mitchell demonstrated no apparent bias towards either the unionists or 
the nationalists throughout the talks. The case of Northern Ireland thus disproves the 
hypothesis that biased mediations are more successful. Third, throughout the process, 
Mitchell and his colleagues had no tangible leverage over the conflicting parties, yet they 
were able to harness his personal legitimacy to persuade the parties to move towards the 
agreement. That the process resulted in an agreement lends credence to the third hypothesis 
that a mediator’s personal leverage can lead to a successful mediation outcome. Finally, the 
chairmen adopted a communication-facilitation strategy which, over time, helped establish 
somewhat cooperative relationships both between the disputants and between the parties and 
the mediators. Had a more direct strategy been employed it would have likely driven the 
parties further apart rather than bringing them closer together. The Northern Irish experience 
suggests that, in protracted conflicts, facilitative strategies are more successful than 
manipulative ones.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The dissolution of Yugoslavia, set in motion by the death of Tito in 1980, precipitated a 
number of chaotic and violent confrontations in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Macedonia. Although Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, and eventually Bosnia, have all seen 
their conflicts resolved, the crisis in Kosovo, characterised by “competing claims to the right 
of self-determination, sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Burg 2007, 183), has persisted 
over time and refused to yield to efforts at political settlement. In 2005, following the failure 
of previous attempts to negotiate a settlement to the conflict, the UN Secretary-General 
appointed former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to lead another effort by the international 
community to determine Kosovo’s final status.  
Ahtisaari faced the seemingly insurmountable task of reconciling the diametrically opposed 
positions of two parties left deeply embittered by a legacy of inter-ethnic violence, 
domination, discrimination and exclusion. In its most basic form, the conflict in Kosovo was 
driven by mutually exclusive claims to control over territory (Burg 2007, 201). However, the 
Serbian state’s discriminatory and oppressive policies towards its ethnic minorities, 
exacerbated the situation in the province, and violence soon trumped dialogue as the Kosovar 
Albanians’ favoured method for pursuing political change.  
 
4.1.1 SOURCES OF INTRACTABILITY 
The intractable nature of the Kosovo conflict stems from the disintegration of the Yugoslav 
state, which was primarily brought about by the “effects of several mutually reinforcing 
conflicts” engendered by the growing ethno-nationalism of Yugoslavia’s peoples, and 
motivated by unresolved historical grievances (Burg 2007, 184). Claims for the right to self-
determination in the dissolving state were linked to both territory and ethnic identity: where 
ethnic populations transcended republic and provincial boundaries, the assertion of ethnic 
group claims to self-determination and sovereignty “engendered conflicts over definition of 
the borders of the emerging successor states, over the rights to be enshrined in their new 
constitutions, and even over the legitimacy of their very existence” (Burg 2007, 188). In 
Kosovo, the territorially compact ethnic-Albanian majority clamoured for independence from 
the Serbian state. Sovereign control of the territory, however, was seen by the Serbs as a 
zero-sum issue, and thus Serbia was unwilling to compromise or attempt to negotiate a 
peaceful solution with the Kosovar Albanians.  
The dire state of Kosovo’s socio-economic situation, and the extensive underdevelopment in 
the province repeatedly fuelled popular restlessness and stirred up ethnic tensions between 
the two communities. Throughout the period of provincial administration, the minority Serb 
population believed that they were being actively discriminated against, creating an 
increasingly bitter atmosphere in Kosovo. In March 1981, Kosovar Albanian students 
organised peaceful demonstrations to protest against poor living conditions and the lack of 
employment opportunities in the province. There were also calls for Kosovo’s status within 
Yugoslavia to be upgraded to that of a republic. The protests rapidly escalated into violent 
riots and resulted in more than one thousand deaths and many more injuries (Ramet 1992, 
196). The federal authorities reacted without delay, tightening their grip over the province.  
In an attempt to quell the unrest caused by the riots, Yugoslav authorities prosecuted several 
thousand Kosovar Albanians on charges of separatism between 1981 and 1987 (Vuković 
2013, 153). Most certainly, the indiscriminate prosecution of ethnic Albanians contributed to 
the development of deep feelings of distrust towards the Yugoslav government. 
Compounding the problem was the Belgrade media which, fuelled by the stories of Serbs in 
exile from Kosovo, began to publish articles of Albanian atrocities, and labelled the crisis in 
Kosovo as ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the Serbs. These stories contributed to the development of 
irrevocable stereotypes of Kosovar Albanians in the eyes of the Serbian audience which were 
adeptly manipulated by nationalist politicians (Vuković 2013, 153). Tit-for-tat violence 
throughout the 1980s served to sustain a highly charged and volatile environment.   
 
4.1.2 THE EMPLOYMENT OF REPRESSIVE MEASURES 
A more immediate basis for the Kosovo crisis began in 1987 with the rise of Slobodan 
Milosevic and the reinvigoration of nationalist rhetoric and policies. Nationalist politicians 
played on their constituents’ fears that the Slavic population in Kosovo was demographically 
in decline, and that Kosovo would be lost imminently. Thus, Serbian nationalists sought to 
implement a programme designed to reduce the number of Albanians within Kosovo 
(Vuković 2013, 154). In 1989, Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy (which it had been 
granted after a change in the Yugoslav constitution in 1974) and established direct rule from 
Belgrade, dramatically escalating the conflict (Rees 2000).  
In July 1990, the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia introduced a permanent state of 
emergency throughout Kosovo. Under ‘emergency measures’ implemented by the Serbian 
authorities, more than “100,000 ethnic Albanians were fired from factories, mines, schools, 
hospitals, judiciary, cultural institutions, media, public services, and municipal and regional 
authorities” and replaced by Serbs, Montenegrins, or pro-Serbian Albanians (Troebst 1998, 
18). Authorities issued further orders outlawing all Albanian political and cultural 
organisations and associations. Furthermore, Albanian students were expelled from 
universities and a new curriculum – using Serbian language and Serbian histories – was 
imposed (Vuković 2013, 154). The use of the state’s security forces to enforce compliance 
with these measures distinguished Kosovo as the region with one of the worst human rights 
records in Europe at the time (Nizich 1992). 
The radicalisation of the Kosovar Albanian separatist tendencies, which arose from the 
failure of non-violent methods to secure progress, considerably reduced the scope for 
moderate solutions to the conflict. Similarly, Serbia’s reaction to the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) further narrowed the likelihood of accommodation. In March 1998, under the 
guise of anti-terrorism activities, the Republic’s Special Anti-Terror Units cracked down on 
the KLA in Drenica, in the process killing more than eighty Albanians, among them women, 
children and elderly persons (Troebst 1998, 15). In addition, Serbian riot police brutally 
dispersed a crowd of several tens-of-thousands of Albanian demonstrators in Pristina. 
Ultimately, a number of factors contributed to the conflict’s intractability. However, the fact 
that the relationship between the parties was bitter and hostile (thanks to repeated negative 
interactions over the course of the conflict), and given the nature of the issue in dispute, the 
task of Ahtisaari and the other third parties was made far more difficult. For any negotiated 
process to be successful, a significant effort by the mediators to build trust and establish a 
cooperative working relationship between the disputants would be essential. Without this, 
any apparent ‘gain’ by the other side or perceived ‘loss’ by the party would entrench the 
parties in their respective positions, making compromise even more unlikely.   
 
4.2 PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 
The two parties to the Kosovo conflict that participated in the international mediation efforts 
between 2005 and 2007 were the Republic of Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians. Historical 
events have meant that what constitutes ‘Serbia’ has varied over time, but for convenience, 
‘Serbia’ is used here to refer to the group governing from Belgrade. The Serbian political 
elites have long been divided in their reaction to the efforts of international actors to mediate 
the conflict between the regime, nationalist opposition, and democratic opposition (Troebst 
1998, 29).  At the time of the Ahtisaari-led mediation process, Serbia was governed by a 
coalition, within which there was an intense rivalry between the pro-European President 
Boris Tadić (Democratic Party), and the nationalist Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica 
(Democratic Party of Serbia). Tadić argued that the best interests of the Serbs would be 
served by continuing to engage with Europe and the process of European integration. By 
doing so, Serbia would be better able to combat Kosovo’s demand for international 
acceptance and avoid international isolation (IISS 2008). Kostunica, however, argued that as 
the EU had sent an illegal mission to a ‘fake state’, Serbia should only continue engage with 
the EU if it rescinded its decision (IISS 2008).  
Internal divisions also existed between the Kosovar representatives. Although all factions 
agreed that independence was the only acceptable solution to the conflict, they disagreed on 
how best to achieve this goal. The Democratic League of Kosovo Party (LDK) which had led 
the mass resistance movement of the 1980s insisted that only peaceful methods should be 
employed. It was not until the local Serb minority, backed by the power of the state in 
Belgrade, enforced its claim to Kosovo by means of brutal repression that the Kosovar 
Albanians began to recognise the futility of non-violence against the Serbian state. The de 
facto partition of Bosnia at Dayton further signalled to many Albanians in Kosovo that the 
attention of international actors could only be obtained through violent resistance. Dayton 
thus increased Albanians’ impatience with their own lack of progress, and provided the 
impetus for the emergence in 1996 of the KLA which was willing to use force to achieve 
independence.  
It is also important to note here the role of the International Contact Group (ICG), from 
which much of the international response to the conflict came. The Group, comprising 
France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US, was initially convened to respond to the 
Bosnian war. It had no organisational structure and was thus ultimately beholden to the 
interests of its member states. Whilst the Group was able to issue six statements between 
March 1998 and January 1999 condemning the actions of both Serb paramilitaries and the 
KLA, and was able to induce both parties to the negotiating table by using its considerable 
leverage (borrowed from the US and Russia), its failure to agree upon a common vision for 
the conflict’s end ultimately led to the failure of previous mediation efforts.   
 
4.3 PREVIOUS SETTLEMENT ATTEMPTS 
It would be wrong to suggest that the international community had made no attempt to 
resolve the Kosovo crisis prior to the Ahtisaari mediation process. A number of proposals for 
constitutional and administrative reforms were made, with the aim being to create a non-zero-
sum outcome to the conflict, but “so deep [were] the divisions between the two camps, and 
within them as well, that no single moderate solution [enjoyed] the support of all parties” 
(Caplan 1998, 758).  
A demand for the restoration of self-governance for Kosovo was included in the initial 
attempt to achieve an overall settlement to the Yugoslav crisis in October 1991. However, no 
substantive progress was made in relation to Kosovo, and the issue was left to “languish into 
a silent death with no progress having been made” (Weller 1999, 218). Hopes for a settlement 
for Kosovo were again raised in 1995 during the Dayton negotiations, yet Kosovo was 
mentioned only once in the final treaty, in connection with the preconditions for lifting the 
remaining sanctions against Serbia. For reasons of political expediency, the Kosovo issue was 
sidelined during Dayton: first, it was felt that there was simply too much to negotiate already, 
and second, nobody wished to alienate Milosevic whose continued cooperation was thought 
necessary to ensure the successful implementation of the accord.  
In the aftermath of Dayton, various international and regional organisations, ranging from 
NATO to the OSCE, sought to resolve Kosovo’s crisis. Several proposals were debated 
privately, yet none succeeded in bridging the gap between the parties or settling the issue. In 
1999, as Serbian offensives in Kosovo increased, the ICG met and agreed to summon 
representatives of the two parties to Rambouillet, France, to participate in negotiations 
headed by international intermediaries. NATO welcomed the ICG’s actions, and threatened 
the use of airstrikes if the parties did not participate in the peace conference. Following these 
credible threats, the disputants agreed to engage in negotiations.  
 
4.3.1 THE RAMBOUILLET AGREEMENT 
The Contact Group fully agreed that the conflict in Kosovo needed to be managed as 
promptly as possible. It therefore presented the parties at Rambouillet with a document 
containing ‘non-negotiable principles’, or basic elements for a settlement. These principles 
included an immediate end to violence; a peaceful solution through dialogue; a high level of 
self-governance for Kosovo through its own institutions; the protection of human rights; the 
preservation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s (FRY) territory; and the protection of 
the rights of the members of all national communities within Serbia (Weller 1999, 225-26). 
The mediators considered the parties’ participation in negotiations as signalling their implicit 
acceptance of these principles.  
The mediation was conducted by three key negotiators – Christopher Hill (US), Wolfgang 
Petritsch (EU), and Boris Mayorski (Russian Federation) – who were appointed by the 
Contact Group and expected to represent the interests of the entire coalition and not of their 
state of origin (Vuković 2013, 171). At the beginning of the conference, both parties received 
a draft version of a political settlement. The mediators also formulated a strict procedure for 
the process: the parties were not expected to engage in direct talks, but rather submit 
comments on the draft. If both sides agreed to a modification, it would be included; if there 
was no consensus, no alteration would take place.  
The Kosovo delegation submitted written comments on the draft and claimed that, in 
principle, the document was acceptable. The Serbian delegation was obstructive, and focused 
on de-legitimising the Kosovo delegation instead of providing feedback on the draft. 
Nevertheless, the mediators urged the Serbian delegation to submit comments or suggestions 
on the first draft. The revised draft included almost all the Serbian delegation’s demands and 
largely ignored the Kosovo delegation’s suggestions. The revised draft was presented as a 
final version of a political settlement, which both parties refused to accept. The Kosovo 
delegation considered the proposal as “a direct result of talks between mediators and the 
Serbian delegation”, which to them represented a betrayal of their trust in the process 
(Vuković 2013, 172).  
Both delegations insisted on further changes. Realising that neither side was willing to accept 
the document, mediators extended the deadline for the talks to consider both sides’ positions. 
This time, the procedure involved proximity talks: substantive suggestions from one side 
were channelled through a body of legal experts to the other side (Vuković 2013, 172). Using 
this method, the mediators were able to produce a new draft entitled the ‘Interim Agreement 
for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo’ (1999), which prescribed that Kosovo would not 
be an independent state but a component part of Yugoslavia with a status somewhere between 
an autonomous province and a federal unit. Kosovo’s status within Yugoslavia was to be 
safeguarded by an international supervisory institution with binding decision-making powers.   
The Kosovo delegation signed the agreement on 18 March 1999, but for the Serbian 
delegation, the negotiations were far from being concluded. Believing that they had the 
support of the Russian delegation, they objected to withdrawing Serbian forces from Kosovo 
and allowing the presence of foreign troops on ‘Serbian soil’. Throughout the process, 
Russian officials had acted somewhat duplicitously, thereby sending the Serbian delegation 
false signals. Although Russia recognised that an agreement was not feasible without an 
outside military presence to implement it, they did not offer any alternative to Western plans 
to use NATO forces. Rather, Russia’s interests diverged from the rest of the coalition, 
contributing to the lack of coordination between the mediators. Russian intransigence meant 
that the mediators were unable to coordinate their leverages on both parties to the conflict: 
“while one group was exercising pressure and creating required incentives for the Kosovo 
delegation to accept the agreement, the Russians were abstaining from exercising their 
indispensible leverage on the Serbian delegation to do the same” (Vuković 2013, 175-76). As 
the Serbian delegation perceived Russia’s actions as tacit support for their position, they 
assumed a much more unyielding position which prevented them from signing the agreement. 
On 22 March 1999, the negotiators and Ambassador Holbrooke went to Belgrade in an 
attempt to persuade the FRY to stop its offensive operations and sign the agreement. When 
these efforts failed, Holbrooke briefed NATO leaders, who instigated NATO military action. 
The Rambouillet process failed for several reasons. Foremost among them was the 
divergence of Russian interests from the other ICG’s members. This sent mixed signals to the 
Serbian delegation which, believing that Russia fully supported its position, became 
increasingly disengaged from the process. Furthermore, thanks to Russia’s tacit support, 
Serbia did not yet perceive itself to be in a MHS. The conflict was not yet ripe for resolution 
(H1).   
 
4.4 THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, severe abuses of human rights in Kosovo represented the 
main concern for American diplomats. However, “this concern was more superficial than 
what was needed for Americans to be more actively engaged in managing the crisis” 
(Vuković 2013, 159). At the same time, for the US, the situation in Kosovo represented only 
one (relatively small) component of the overall crisis Yugoslavia was going through. 
American unwillingness to become involved was facilitated by the Western Europeans’ 
argument that Europe should be the one dealing with issues in Yugoslavia. However, 
although European states were motivated to act to restore order in their backyard, they lacked 
a common perception of the situation in Kosovo. Whilst the UK and France insisted that 
Europe’s primary concern should be the preservation of territorial integrity, Italy and 
Germany were much more inclined to promote human rights and democratic standards, 
which for them represented euphemisms for the principle of self-determination (Vuković 
2013, 160).  
Europe’s failure to take decisive action was rationalised by the findings of the Badinter 
Commission (1991) which issued a number of important opinions concerning the legal status 
of Yugoslavia and its constituent units. In November 1991, the commission concluded that 
Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution and that the republics seeking independence 
were not rebel entities but “new states created on the territory of the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia” (Caplan 1998, 747). This finding was important because it allowed 
a line to be drawn between entities whose independence would be legitimately recognised 
and those whose independence would not. As Kosovo was not a republic, the EU (and by 
extension, the international community) refused to consider its request for recognition as an 
independent state which it submitted in 1991.  
The disproportionate use of violence by Serb forces to crackdown on KLA activities 
prompted more compelling third-party efforts to mediate the conflict. However, initial efforts 
were equivocal. In March 1998, for example, the Contact Group threatened new sanctions 
against Serbia unless Belgrade withdrew its special forces from Kosovo and began an 
unconditional dialogue with the Albanian leadership by the end of March. Neither condition 
had been met by the time the Contact Group reconvened in April 1998. On the contrary, 
Milosevic had launched fresh attacks but the group chose nonetheless to postpone the 
threatened freeze on Yugoslavia’s assets abroad for another month, arguing that Milosevic 
had made progress towards meeting their demands (Caplan 1998, 754).  
Until the mid-1990s, Russia held a very rigid position on the issue of Kosovo’s legal status, 
insisting that any mention of self-governance should be on the condition that Kosovo 
remained within Serbia’s formal jurisdiction (Levitin 2005, 136). With the outbreak of 
hostilities in the second half of 1998, Moscow began to contemplate the idea of a special 
status for Kosovo, always within the Yugoslav federation. Finally, in late 2005, Russia made 
it clear to Serbia that Moscow would not be drawn into a confrontation with the West over 
Kosovo and that they would not veto any UNSC Resolution promoting independence (ICG 
2006, 11). However, in January 2006, Russia reversed its position and claimed that it would 
not support any settlement imposed on Serbia, arguing that the outcome should be acceptable 
to both sides (Vuković 2013, 188). Serbia interpreted Russia’s stance as tacit support for its 
position, and consequently hardened its stance.  
Thus, the international environment was not particularly conducive to successful negotiations 
between the two parties. Although the majority of the international representatives 
(particularly the UN Secretary-General, the OSCE, the EU, and the US) involved in Kosovo 
appeared to accept, as a result of the violence in the province, that Kosovo could no longer 
remain within Serbia, the Russians remained an important ally for Serbia. Furthermore, at 
Rambouillet the parties were coerced to the negotiating table by credible military, economic 
and political threats. Would they have agreed to talks without these threats? Was the conflict 
ripe for settlement? Did Serbia perceive itself to be in a MHS situation?  
 
4.5 THE PARTIES’ APPRAISAL OF THE CONFLICT 
Determining the vulnerability of a party is, according to Fridl (2009, 79), achieved by 
determining their ‘security point’, defined as “the outcome a party would have without 
negotiating”. Belgrade’s security point was a rebellious Kosovo retaining its status as part of 
Serbia, whereas for Pristina, the security point was facing the spiralling effects of remaining 
‘in limbo’ and potentially losing the momentum of the great powers’ support in the quest for 
independence. For Belgrade, no negotiations meant Kosovo remained part of Serbia; Serbia 
therefore lacked any compelling incentive to negotiate. Although Serbia took part in the 
international community’s efforts to reach a negotiated settlement, it is difficult to argue that, 
had it not been for the coercive efforts of various international actors, there would have been 
negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo. The conflict was not yet ripe for settlement as the 
parties differed in their perceptions of their respective positions.  
 
4.6 THE VIENNA PROCESS 
In May 2005, the UN Secretary-General appointed Kai Eide to carry out a comprehensive 
assessment of the situation in Kosovo, in order to determine whether conditions in the 
province were suitable to permit discussion on Kosovo’s final status. On 7 October 2005, 
Ambassador Eide concluded that while the standards implementation in Kosovo had been 
uneven, “an overall assessment leads to the conclusion that the time [had] come to commence 
the process” (Eide 2005, 4). In late October 2005, the Secretary-General appointed Martti 
Ahtisaari to lead the international effort, representing the culmination of a process authorised 
by UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) which had mandated “a political process designed to 
determine Kosovo’s future status”. Ahtisaari’s office – the UN Office of the Special Envoy 
for Kosovo (UNOSEK) – was located in Vienna, Austria, and included liaison staff from 
NATO, the EU and the US.  
The Contact Group established a framework for Ahtisaari’s team comprising ten principles 
for a settlement. These included that Kosovo must not return to the pre-March 1999 situation, 
that any settlement should be fully compatible with international law and human rights, and 
should ensure a multi-ethnic society. The ICG also stated that any unilateral solution, or any 
solution involving partition, would be unacceptable. It further called for arrangements for 
good relations between Belgrade and Pristina to be part of any settlement.  
 
4.6.1 THE MEDIATOR 
Ahtisaari and his team faced substantial hurdles: the recent historical relationship between the 
Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs was bitter, and hostility and mistrust was high. 
Furthermore, the nature of the issue was zero-sum and the parties were entrenched in their 
positions, believing that they had the international community (Kosovo) or international law 
(Serbia) on their side. Thus, to be successful, Ahtisaari would first have to mend the parties’ 
relationship before attempting to address their mutually exclusive positions on the issues. 
Ahtisaari was an experienced diplomat and negotiator, having successfully mediated in 
Namibia, Aceh and Iraq. Furthermore, coming from Finland, Ahtisaari’s institutional status 
was perceived as less-threatening to the parties, making him initially more acceptable as a 
mediator.  
 
4.6.2 THE TALKS 
The parties to the process faced tough issues, including the future – and final – status of 
Kosovo, the protection of minorities within a multi-ethnic society, and the creation of 
sustainable institutions of governance that could be supported by Kosovo Serbs. Belgrade 
argued that Kosovo should enjoy substantial autonomy, but not independence. It argued that 
independence would be a violation of Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and 
therefore contrary to the UN Charter and international law. The Kosovo Albanian delegation 
asserted that Kosovo could not remain within a Serbian state and that only independence 
would create regional stability. In order to determine why the Kosovo negotiations ended in 
failure, I consider Ahtisaari’s approach from three different perspectives: his process strategy, 
his issues strategy, and his timing strategy.  
 
4.6.3 THE PROCESS STRATEGY 
From the beginning, Ahtisaari was given considerable ‘room to manoeuvre’ by the Contact 
Group (ICG 2006). With the Group’s ten guiding principles for a peaceful settlement 
established, Ahtisaari was instructed that once the process had begun, it could not be blocked 
and must be brought to conclusion. From the beginning it was evident that the mediation 
process would involve a mixture of formulator and directive strategies: the Contact Group 
had prescribed the non-negotiable principles, while Ahtisaari was supposed to explore, 
formulate and offer solutions to both sides (Vuković 2013, 183-84). 
Ahtisaari initially assumed a very constructive procedural-formulator strategy. Through 
informal talks with representatives from Belgrade and Pristina, he explored the positions of 
both sides for a period of three months. He concluded that for the Serbian authorities, any 
decision had to be in line with the UN Charter which, for them, guaranteed the inviolability 
of the borders of a sovereign state. In contrast, Kosovo’s leaders expected the mediation 
process to formalise the reality of the situation on the ground where, thanks to UN 
involvement as mandated by UNSC Resolution 1244, Kosovo was already developing all the 
institutions necessary for a functioning independent state (Vuković 2013, 185).  
At the beginning of the talks on 20 February 2006, Ahtisaari established a timeframe for the 
process and stated his expectation that negotiations would be concluded within 2006. The 
possibility of EU membership was perceived as the main ‘carrot’ for both sides in the 
process, as both parties had previously declared their commitment to EU membership (H3). 
Ahtisaari’s initial strategy made little headway towards an agreement. However, the adoption 
of a more active strategy such as forcing the parties to negotiate substantive issues early on, 
would likely have backfired, leaving the parties even further apart and entrenched in their 
respective positions.  
 
4.6.4 THE ISSUE STRATEGY 
In order to reduce the chasm between the two sides Ahtisaari realised that the negotiations 
must be structured in such a way that the far less contentious ‘technical’ issues were tackled 
first. Technical issues included decentralisation, community rights, and the protection of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church. In this way, it was hoped that both sides would offer concessions 
and establish a working relationship from which the question of Kosovo’s final status could 
be addressed more constructively.  
Nevertheless, five rounds of talks served only to reinforce the number of substantial 
differences between the two sides. As the time for negotiations began to run out, Ahtisaari 
recognised that it was highly unlikely that the parties would achieve a negotiated settlement 
regarding Kosovo’s final status. Increasing signals from the international community, 
particularly from US President Bush, who declared in June 2007 that the US believed 
“Kosovo ought to be independent” (Malveaux 2007), made Kosovo’s leaders less disposed to 
negotiate, and more impatient to formalise their new status.  
These signals also made Serbia realise that the international community was somewhat united 
in its quest to grant Kosovo independence. Belgrade quickly lost all faith in the sincerity of 
the negotiations and, as a result, became passive and non-committal. The Serbian delegation 
believed that “any constructive attempts made would be perceived wrongly as Serbian 
willingness to accept the independence of Kosovo” (Fridl 2009, 80). The Serbs sensed that 
Ahtisaari had a particular goal in mind (Kosovo’s independence) and that, rather than 
attempting to build trust between the two parties, he was focusing his efforts on coercing 
Serbia towards this pre-determined outcome. Serbia therefore began to perceive Ahtisaari as 
an adversarial mediator, biased in favour of the Kosovo Albanians’ cause, and therefore 
untrustworthy.  
Ultimately, Serbia perceived Ahtisaari as a biased mediator who had failed to offer Serbia a 
‘Way Out’ through negotiations. For Serbian politicians, accepting Kosovo’s independence 
would be tantamount to political suicide, yet Ahtisaari refused to offer or consider any 
proposal which deviated from his interpretation of Kosovo’s final status. Thus, in this 
instance, a biased mediator obstructed the process and provoked a backlash from Serbia 
which felt victimised by the process (H2).  
 
4.6.5 THE TIMING STRATEGY 
Serbia’s uncooperative attitude led Ahtisaari to claim that the potential for negotiations had 
been exhausted. Fridl (2009, 84) argues that Ahtisaari’s attitude towards the negotiations had 
a “plummeting effect on both parties’ willingness to explore alternatives in finding a 
mutually acceptable agreement”. Both parties were discouraged from departing from their 
positions towards the centre. Instead of pushing for further negotiations, Ahtisaari focused on 
developing and presenting a comprehensive settlement package to the ICG which would, in 
turn, be voted on by the UNSC. While not explicitly mentioning ‘independence’ – in order to 
improve the chances of its acceptance by all members of the ICG and the disputants – 
Ahtisaari’s plan included several provisions that were widely interpreted as implying 
statehood for Kosovo. Ahtisaari explained his position on Kosovo’s independence as follows: 
“for the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation. The 
establishment of the UNMIK pursuant to resolution 1244 has created a situation in which 
Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. A return to Serbian rule over 
Kosovo would not be acceptable...Autonomy within the borders of Serbia is simply not 
tenable” (S/2007/168). After taking into account the negotiations with the parties, Ahtisaari 
concluded that the only viable option for Kosovo was independence.  
For the Western countries of the Contact Group, the proposal was seen as fair and balanced. 
They argued in favour of its immediate acceptance, and cautioned that any delay could create 
instability (Vuković 2013, 190). Russia, accusing Ahtisaari of conducting “shallow and 
abbreviated negotiations” (ICG 2007, 6), proposed instead to retain the major provisions of 
Resolution 1244 with selective implementation of parts of the proposal.  
 
4.7 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
On 17 February 2008, after the failure of multiple diplomatic efforts, Kosovo unilaterally 
declared its independence from Serbia, becoming the seventh state to emerge from the 
wreckage of the former Yugoslavia. The Kosovo experience offers a number of lessons for 
policymakers seeking to negotiate an intractable conflict: first, it highlights the importance of 
ripeness. Essentially, Serbia never perceived itself to be in a MHS and only participated in 
talks at Russia’s insistence. Indeed, once Russian support for the process diminished, the 
Serbian government refused to accept the Ahtisaari process and subsequently began to stall 
and attempt to disrupt the mediation effort. The conflict was not yet ripe for settlement, and it 
is possible to argue that without Russia’s presence, negotiations may never have taken place.  
Second, Serbia’s belief that Ahtisaari was a biased mediator fundamentally undermined the 
process. Once it became clear that Ahtisaari – and the wider international community – 
implicitly supported independence for Kosovo, the Serbian delegation perceived his every 
move as a tactical manoeuvre aimed at securing Kosovo’s independence at Serbia’s expense. 
Although Ahtisaari was more partial towards Kosovo, he failed to move the Kosovar 
delegation towards a mutually acceptable compromise. Furthermore, although the carrot of 
EU membership was placed in front of the parties, Ahtisaari achieved few, if any, 
compromises from either party. Given the embittered context of the conflict, Ahtisaari’s 
‘bias’ meant that he could not use his personal leverage to push the parties towards 
agreement. Thus, in this instance, a biased mediator undermined, rather than facilitated, the 
mediation.  
Finally, Ahtisaari’s belief that the only viable solution for Kosovo was its independence 
significantly affected his strategy. Believing that Serbia’s disengagement from the process 
had made reaching a compromise settlement impossible, Ahtisaari abandoned his initial 
communication-facilitation strategy and attempted to push the parties towards his pre-
determined solution. This backfired, ostensibly because the Serbs perceived this as further 
evidence of his preference for Kosovo’s position. Furthermore, the nature of the issue in 
dispute – independence and territorial integrity – does not lend itself to directive strategies. 
Thus, in this instance, a manipulative strategy did not bring about a successful outcome.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis in the previous two chapters traced the sequential processes leading to the final 
mediation outcome in both Northern Ireland and Kosovo. This chapter uses Mill’s method of 
difference and applies the logic of elimination to the two cases in order to determine which of 
the hypothesised variables may explain their respective outcomes. It then continues by 
offering some general conclusions about the two mediation efforts before discussing the 
limitations of this thesis and highlighting potential avenues for future research.  
 
5.2 TIMING AND MEDIATION OUTCOME 
The first hypothesis considered the validity of the argument that mediated interventions 
which occur at a later stage of a conflict are more likely to be successful than those occurring 
at an earlier stage. Directly linked to this – as demonstrated in chapter two – is the concept of 
ripeness. A conflict is ripe for settlement when the parties realise that they are in a mutually 
hurting stalemate and that a peaceful agreement is a preferable alternative to continued 
fighting. This realisation, although partly perceptual, is primarily influenced by objective 
evidence ‘on the ground’. This evidence is far more likely to come at a later stage of the 
conflict, once several alternative avenues have been exhausted.  
Considering the cases of Northern Ireland and Kosovo, it is possible to conclude that 
although both third-party interventions came at a later stage of the conflict (after two decades 
in both), only in Northern Ireland did the parties perceive mediation as a preferable 
alternative to continued stalemate. A within-case analysis further proves the validity of the 
first hypothesis: both the Sunningdale and Anglo-Irish Agreements failed to resolve the 
conflict because the parties did not feel that they were in a MHS, nor were the agreements 
preferable to what they felt they could win from continuing to fight. The GFA, however, was 
reached after significant changes in the context of the conflict pushed the parties to realise the 
reality of their situations. In Kosovo, by contrast, Serbia did not perceive itself to be in a 
MHS. Rather, it believed that the international community’s respect for the provisions of the 
UN Charter and international law would guarantee its territorial integrity. Only at Russia’s 
insistence did Serbia agree to join negotiations at Rambouillet and Vienna. Thus, the 
Ahtisaari process was brought about not by any significant change in the context of the 
conflict, but by ICG coercion.  
To conclude, if timing and ripeness are understood as directly correlated, it is possible to 
affirm the validity of the first hypothesis as an explanation of mediation success in Northern 
Ireland and mediation failure in Kosovo.   
 
5.3 (IM)PARTIALITY AND MEDIATION OUTCOME 
The second hypothesis considered the validity of the statement that biased mediators are 
more effective in intractable conflicts than impartial mediators. Bias was defined as the 
prejudice of a mediator in favour of or against one group, as perceived by the disputants. 
Analysing the two cases, it is possible to conclude that the biased mediator was less 
successful than the impartial mediator.  
In Northern Ireland, although unionist parties had initial concerns about the mediating team’s 
impartiality, several decisions taken by Mitchell served to allay their concerns and reinforce 
the parties’ perceptions of Mitchell as an impartial mediator. In contrast, during the Vienna 
process, Ahtisaari was thought by the Serbian delegation to be untrustworthy and biased in 
favour of the Kosovar Albanians. Despite his endeavours to create a compromise between the 
parties, the Serbs believed that his efforts were simply a cover to achieve his real ambition of 
independence for Kosovo. Serbia’s perception of Ahtisaari as a biased mediator led them to 
obstruct the process and disengage from negotiations. 
To conclude, in the context of Northern Ireland’s intractable conflict, where the relationship 
between the parties was almost non-existent, impartiality was a key mediator attribute. Given 
that the state of the relationship between the parties in Kosovo was very similar to Northern 
Ireland, the presence of a biased mediator undermined the effort and contributed to the failure 
of the Vienna process.  
 
5.4 PERSONAL LEVERAGE AND MEDIATION OUTCOME 
Understood in the traditional sense, leverage typically refers to the mediator’s ability to 
pressure one or both of the parties to accept a proposed settlement through positive 
inducements or negative sanctions. Some argue that leverage is indispensible for persuading 
conflicting parties to make concessions or ensuring they stick to the conditions of settlement. 
Others claim that a mediator’s lack of power may actually help facilitate success by 
increasing the possibility of a mediator being accepted by the parties. The third hypothesis 
therefore studied the mediator’s personal leverage – legitimacy – in order to determine if it 
could be associated with the mediation outcomes in Northern Ireland or Kosovo. Legitimacy 
was understood to derive from a mediator’s personal reputation and personal leverage was 
thus the ability of the mediator to influence the process by building on the parties’ belief that 
he has the right to prescribe behaviour. 
In Northern Ireland, Mitchell had no tangible leverage as understood in the traditional sense. 
Rather, the British and Irish governments retained ultimate control over the process. In 
Kosovo, Ahtisaari was given considerable room to manoeuvre by the ICG, and the ‘carrot’ of 
possible EU membership was put on the table to induce the parties to negotiate. Nevertheless, 
in Northern Ireland, Mitchell invested considerable energy in building relationships between 
the mediating coalition and the negotiating parties. Gradually, the parties began to trust 
Mitchell and sought to cooperate with him. In the final weeks of the mediation effort, 
Mitchell used the considerable legitimacy he had built up throughout the process to push the 
parties to an agreement.  
In comparison, in Kosovo, Ahtisaari’s personal leverage was constricted by Serbia’s belief in 
his partiality towards Kosovo. Once it became clear that Ahtisaari was in favour of 
substantial autonomy for Kosovo – which for the Serbs meant independence – Ahtisaari 
scuppered his chance to establish fruitful, cooperative, and trusting relationships with both 
parties.  
To conclude, in Northern Ireland, Mitchell had personal – but no tangible – leverage over all 
the disputants, while in Kosovo, Ahtisaari had tangible leverage, yet failed to establish any 
personal leverage over Serbia whose agreement was essential for a successful settlement. In 
this instance, it is possible to argue that Northern Ireland’s mediation process was a success 
because the mediator adeptly exploited his personal legitimacy to secure an agreement 
whereas in Kosovo, the mediator had no such legitimacy to exploit.  
 
5.5 STRATEGY AND MEDIATION OUTCOME 
The final hypothesis tested the validity of the claim that an active strategy is better able to 
secure a successful mediation outcome. This research used Zartman and Touval’s (1985) 
typology of mediator strategies which ranges from the passive ‘mediator as communication-
facilitator’ to the ‘mediator as formulator’, to the most directive ‘mediator as manipulator’. In 
both cases, years of conflict, hostility and repression created an atmosphere in which the 
negotiating parties did not trust each other and were suspicious of cooperating and 
compromising with sworn enemies. In these circumstances, and as demonstrated by the case 
studies, a communication-facilitation strategy (at least in the initial stages) is the most 
effective mediator approach as it allows the parties to gradually establish some semblance of 
a working relationship which, over time, should make compromise possible.  
To conclude, both mediators adopted a communication-facilitation approach, and spent a 
considerable amount of time identifying the parties’ positions and interests, supplying 
missing information, and ensuring that the interests of all parties were discussed. That the 
process in Northern Ireland was successful, yet failed in Kosovo, suggests that mediator 
strategy did not determine the success of Northern Ireland’s peace process.  
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the purpose of this thesis was to determine why the mediation effort in 
Northern Ireland succeeded while third-party efforts to resolve the Kosovo issue failed. As 
the preceding analysis has shown, the timing of the third-party mediation effort, in addition to 
the behavioural attributes of mediator impartiality and legitimacy help explain the ultimate 
success of Northern Ireland’s mediation process. Similarly the failure of third-party efforts in 
Kosovo may be attributed to inauspicious timing, Serbia’s perception of the mediator as 
biased, and Ahtisaari’s failure to build any personal leverage over Serbia, whose 
acquiescence was ultimately necessary for any political settlement. 
As stated in the first chapter, this research considered a mediation process ‘successful’ if it 
resulted in a ceasefire, the signing of an agreement or some form of political settlement. This 
definition is seriously limited by its failure to account for mediation efforts in which no 
agreement was reached, but the parties themselves perceived that progress had been made. 
Furthermore, the signing of a peace agreement does not necessarily translate to a durable 
peace: in Angola, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka, agreements were signed that failed to address 
the underlying causes of the conflicts. They later broke down and tensions again escalated. In 
Northern Ireland too, after the adoption of the GFA, the situation remained perilously 
unstable. As the Agreement provided no specific mechanisms for dealing with past histories, 
the question of how to address the conflict’s legacies became the new battleground for the 
two communities. To date, Northern Ireland continues to experience sectarian tensions, as 
was evident in 2012 when riots broke out over Belfast city council’s decision to fly the Union 
flag over City Hall on state occasions rather than every day (BBC 2012). Although it is 
difficult to imagine a return to paramilitary violence, Northern Ireland’s experience cautions 
against overly optimistic expectations of mediated agreements in the context of intractable 
conflicts. Rather, a peace agreement is better understood as one element of a larger process 
which may create some new opportunities but hardly alters all aspects of the conflict. 
Academic focus should turn to the post-agreement stage of a conflict in order to determine 
which conditions are necessary for a settlement to ‘stick’.  
Ultimately, intractable conflicts are often resistant to negotiated solutions, but this does not 
mean that they are impossible to control. In most cases, the most appropriate option is to 
attempt to ‘manage’ the conflict and reduce the levels of tension and violence. Nevertheless, 
conflict management, unless it is accompanied by extensive third-party efforts to foster 
dialogue and change attitudes, does not offer a long-term solution to a conflict. A better 
understanding of the dynamics of intractability may enable practitioners to shorten the 
duration of the conflict or even prevent a conflict from becoming intractable in the first place. 
As witnessed in Northern Ireland and Kosovo, but also in Cyprus, North Korea and 
Israel/Palestine, intractable conflicts exact a heavy toll on society. They are destructive, 
tearing apart a society’s social fabric, limiting its economic and social development, and 
robbing succeeding generations of a hopeful future. Researchers should thus focus their 
attentions on finding ways to prevent intractability from taking root in the first place. To do 
so would not only make an invaluable contribution to the stability of the international system, 
but would irrevocably change the lives of so many who have suffered from the scourge of 
intractable conflicts. 
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